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HIGH PRICES IN THE U.S. FOR LIFE-SAVING
DRUGS: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING THROUGH
TORT LAW?
Paul J. Zwier*
Sudden exorbitant price hikes to patients who have long
taken life-saving drugs are more and more common in today’s
pharmaceutical market. The anxiety caused to patients who have
been prescribed these drugs by their doctors is predictable and
severe. Even when initially covered by insurance or through
government programs, patients and their families can soon be
made destitute by the high copays or caps on payments. This
Essay argues that those who buy up life-saving drugs and decide
to raise their prices, despite their knowledge of the consequences
to patients, are committing the torts of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Despite challenges presented by class certification law, these
patients should be allowed to qualify as a class for purposes of
pursuing a price reduction in these drugs. Through class action
collective bargaining, courts can avoid the pitfalls of waiting for
piecemeal legislation for consumers of individual drugs and still
receive the advantages of free market principled pricing through
collective bargaining. And, in combination with legislation,
patterned on statutes designed to address bad faith insurance
practices, the courts can most effectively moderate high pricing
and curtail pricing practices that may otherwise soon bankrupt
our healthcare system.

Paul J. Zwier is a Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. Many thanks
to my Emory colleagues, David Partlett and Lisa Vertinsky, and the members of the
Remedies Conference, held December 4, 2015, for their excellent edits and suggestions
on an earlier version of this article.
*
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I. INTRODUCTION
The acts of Valeant Pharmaceuticals (Valeant) buying up the
rights to Cuprimine (a drug used to treat Wilson’s disease), and
raising its price,1 and of Turing Pharmaceuticals’ (Turing) buying
up the rights to Daraprim (an AIDS and Cancer drug),2 and
increasing its cost to more than twenty-five times its original
price, without regard for the emotional distress caused to the
patients that take these drugs, are common law torts.3
Public reaction seems to be one of outrage, felt by patients4
and prescribing physicians,5 and even reaching into current
political debates.6 As of the time of the date of this Essay, there
are two different, Senate-led efforts on the subject of high-priced

1. See Andrew Pollack & Sabrina Tavernise, A Drug Company’s Price Tactics
Pinch Insurers and Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2015, at A1. See also Robert Pear,
Health Spending in the U.S. Topped $3 Trillion Last Year, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/us/politics/health-spending-in-us-topped-3trillion-last-year.html?_r=0 (“Retail spending on prescription drugs increased sharply
last year, rising 12.2 percent to $297.7 billion.”).
2. Linda A. Johnson, Exorbitant drug price hikes are becoming more common,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Sept.
27,
2015),
available
at
http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_28879430/exorbitant-drug-price-hikes-arebecoming-more-common; Rafi Mohammed, It’s Time to Rein in Exorbitant
Pharmaceutical Prices, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 15, 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/09/itstime-to-rein-in-exorbitant-pharmaceutical-prices. See generally John Russell, Turing
won’t cut list price of lifesaving drug Daraprim sold at Walgreens, CHICAGO TRIB. (Nov.
25, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-daraprim-price-walgreens1126-biz-20151125-story.html.
3. To make matters worse, the EpiPen has recently been price-hiked. Gretchen
Morgenson, EpiPen Price Rises Could Mean More Riches for Mylan Executives, N.Y.
Times (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/business/at-mylan-letspretend-is-more-than-a-game.html?_r=1.
4. Andrew Pollack & Sabrina Tavernise, Valeant’s Drug Price Strategy Enriches
It, but Infuriates Patients and Lawmakers, N.Y. Times (Oct. 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/business/valeants-drug-price-strategy-enrichesit-but-infuriates-patients-and-lawmakers.html?_r=0.
5. Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y.
Times (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-he-overnightincrease-in-drug-price-raises-protests.html; Andrew Pollack, Big Price Increase for
Tuberculosis
Drug
Is
Rescinded,
N.Y.
Times
(Sept.
21,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/business/big-price-incrase-for-tb-drug-isrescinded.html. But see Andrew Pollack, Martin Shkreli’s Arrest Gives Drug Makers
Cover,
N.Y.
Times
(Dec.
17,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/business/martin-shkreli-arrest-gives-drugmakers-cover.html.
6. Meg Tirrell & Dan Mangan, Clinton calls drug price hike ‘outrageous,’ vows
plan, CNBC (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/21/clinton-calls-drugprice-hike-outrageous-vows-plan.html.
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drugs.7 Although the pricing of U.S. drugs is many times higher
than that of any of its neighbors,8 and even though the U.S.
consumer appears accustomed to high prices, the issue is whether
there are any limits to what drug companies can charge for lifesaving drugs. Perhaps it is time for U.S. law to make clear that
when a company sells life-saving drugs,9 it owes more to its
patient-consumers than to price it according to free market
principles. The nature of the market—lack of choices and exigent
need—should dictate a higher degree of care by the manufacturer
in its pricing of its product.
Valeant purchased the rights to Cuprimine, and quadrupled
its price overnight.10 The Mayo Clinic defines Wilson’s disease as
a “rare, inherited disorder that causes too much copper to
accumulate in your liver, brain and other vital organs.”11
Symptoms of the disease typically present between ages twelve
and twenty-three.12 When diagnosed early, Wilson’s disease is
treatable, and many people with the disorder live long and normal
lives.13 Cuprimine is the vital drug of choice that, while not a cure
for the disease, makes that long life possible.14 Without
7. Senate Hearings Investigate Rising Price of Medications, NPR (Dec. 9, 2015),
http://www.npr.org/2015/12/09/459026284/senate-hearings-to-investigate-risingprice-of-medications. See Andrew Pollack, Senators Condemn Big Price Increases for
Drugs,
N.Y.
Times
(Dec.
9,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/business/senators-condemn-big-price-increasesfor-drugs.html?_r=0.
8. Kai Rugerri & Ellen Nolte, Pharmaceutical pricing: The use of external
reference
pricing,
RAND
CORP.
(2013),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR240/RAND_
RR240.pdf (comparing pharmaceutical company pricing and profits in European,
Canadian, and other regulated markets with U.S. pharmaceutical company profits).
9. Of course, one of the difficulties in designing a cause of action and a remedy
is to defining what constitutes a life-saving drug. This Author believes that Cuprimine
and Daraprim would qualify, as would most Cancer drugs that either fight tumors,
control pain, or significantly improve the life span and quality of life of the patient.
Perhaps the Canadian’s classification of drugs could also be used to help reward the
breakthrough drug, but not one that is simply marketed by a new owner. See infra,
note 235 and accompanying text.
10. Pollack & Tavernise, supra note 1.
11. Wilson’s
Disease,
MAYO
CLINIC
(Aug.
28,
2014),
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/wilsons-disease/basics/definition/con20043499.
12. Id. (“Copper plays a key role in the development of healthy nerves, bones,
collagen, and the skin pigment melanin. Normally, copper is absorbed from your food,
and any excess is excreted through bile—a substance produced in your liver. But in
people with Wilson’s disease, copper isn’t eliminated properly and instead
accumulates, possibly to a life-threatening level.”).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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Cuprimine, the patient will develop severe liver disease, and,
eventually, dementia.15 Physical symptoms include arm tremors,
fits, difficulty speaking, slow movements, and difficulty
swallowing.16 Prior to Valeant’s takeover, patients paid $888 for
Cuprimine per year in order to live normal lives.17 Now, those
same patients must pay $26,189 each year.18 While Medicare will
cover up to $35,000 per year of the cost,19 patients may now have
to pay $1,800 each month, out-of-pocket.20 In retrospect, it
appears Valeant’s price point for Cuprimine was specifically
picked to hide under Medicare’s yearly cap on costs of a
prescription drug to a patient.21
In August 2015, Turing, a startup company designed to seek
out underpriced drugs,22 paid $55 million to purchase the rights
to Daraprim.23 Daraprim is the only approved treatment for
toxoplasmosis, a rare parasitic infection that strikes pregnant
women, cancer patients, and AIDS patients.24 Soon after the
purchase of Daraprim patents, former hedge fund manager and
Turing’s CEO, Martin Shkreli, raise Daraprim’s price from $13.50
to $750 per pill.25 As a reward for the company’s ability to seek
out underpriced drugs, Turing’s stock initially rose.26 While to
15. Id.
16. Colin

Tidy,
Wilson’s
Disease,
PATIENT
(Nov.
11,
2014),
http://patient.info/health/wilsons-disease-leaflet.
17. Id. See also Andrew Pollack & Sabrina Tavernise, Valeant’s Drug Price
Strategy Enriches It, But Infuriates Patients and Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/business/valeants-drug-price-strategyenriches-it-but-infuriates-patients-and-lawmakers.html?_r=1.
18. Pollack & Tavernise, supra note 1.
19. John Russell, Turing won’t cut list price of lifesaving drug Daraprim sold at
Walgreens,
CHICAGO
TRIBUNE
(Nov.
25,
2015),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-daraprim-price-walgreens-1126-biz20151125-story.html.
20. Pollack & Tavernise, supra note 1.
21. Id.
22. TURING PHARMACEUTICALS, http://www.turingpharma.com/about/company/
(last visited Aug. 18, 2016).
23. Press Release, Impax Investors, Impax Announces Sale of Daraprim® to
Turing
Pharmaceuticals
AG
(Aug.
10,
2015),
available
at
http://investors.impaxlabs.com/Media-Center/Press-Releases/Press-ReleaseDetails/2015/Impax-Announces-Sale-of-Daraprim-to-Turing-PharmaceuticalsAG/default.aspx.
24. Linda A. Johnson, Fury Over Drug Price Spikes Rising, but Increases Aren’t
New,
ALTERNATIVE
PRESS
(Sept.
23,
2015),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/00e14eb3d4804393b4281f1dd2e0c3d5/fury-over-drugprice-spikes-rising-increases-arent-new.
25. Id.
26. Paul R. La Monica, Drug stock soars 400% after Martin Shkreli buys it, CNN
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some, free market means that a company has the right to set
prices according to whatever the market can bear,27 a majority
the public expressed outrage at the stock price, and demanded
that Turing moderate its price.28 As of the date of this Essay,
however, Turing has refused to do so; instead, it has bragged that
it was “selling up market” (e.g., to wealthy people who can afford
the drug).29
One can easily imagine the emotional distress that may be
caused to patients when the learn of the increase in prices for
their life-saving drugs. For some patients, foregoing treatment is
the only viable response to such increases. Other patients will
encounter difficulty with respect to finding adequate funding to
fill the “donut hole” in the drug coverage.30 The conduct of
companies such as Turing presents the U.S. with a clash between
two fundamental values: the market, not the government, sets
prices of goods, and the belief borne out through its history that
compassion and moral integrity are required on behalf of
businesses in order for the market to function.31 Without some
MONEY (Nov. 19, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/11/19/investing/martin-shkrelituring-kalobios-drug/.
27. Jonathon D. Rockoff, Lawmakers Seek Answers on Valeant’s Price Incrases,
WSJ (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/congressional-democrats-seeksubpoena-of-valeant-over-drug-prices-1443468385
(reporting
that
company
spokesman defended pricing by indicating it was selling mostly to “upscale” market).
And, without anything stopping him, Shkreli is continuing to use his strategy to use
government funding designed for the poor, in order to make millions for himself. See
Andrew Pollack, Martin Shkreli’s Latest Plan to Sharply Raise Drug Price Prompts
Outcry,
N.Y.
Times
(Dec.
11,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/12/business/martin-shkrelis-latest-plan-to-sharplyraise-drug-price-prompts-outcry.html.
28. See id.
29. See Russell, supra note 19.
30. Others will hardly notice the increase because it may be covered by Medicare
or by private insurance policies, or because the deductible has been paid for by the
patients. In these cases, any outrage expressed is by the community, rather than by
the individual. As we will see, absent such individual “severe emotional distress,” the
tort law will have difficult deterring the behavior as a tort.
31. Kenneth Abraham, Liability for Bad Faith and the Principle Without a Name
(Yet), 19 CONN. INS. L. J. 1, 12 (2013). In his article, Professor Abraham outlines the
following conflicting values associated with the development of an obligation to
moderate insurance behavior in dealing with insureds:
Hidden Beliefs in the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing:
1. Market power can be used unfairly;
2. Power corrupts;
3. Unchecked and unrestrained self-interest leads to
justifications of harm;
4. Market depends on virtuous actors to moderate power and
greed;
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form of creative thinking by common law judges, or legislation
that makes such exorbitant pricing illegal—and that provides a
civil enforcement remedy—no legal regime can act to deter
exorbitant drug pricing of life-saving drugs.32 Unless, that is,
courts recognize there is one already hidden in the law of torts
(particularly in torts concerning intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED) and negligent infliction of emotional distress
(NIED)), no present legal entity has acted to deter such actions.
Takeovers designed to take advantage of “underpriced” drugs
presents an excellent case study for how the U.S. might develop
policies for dealing with excesses in the marketplace. Is it best to
“sue the bastard,” and use the courts to investigate these matters
on a case-by-case basis (or is it better to investigate a claim as a
class action)? Would it be best for Congress to investigate the
situation, and then promulgate regulations designed to remedy
the matter? Or, is some combination of the two approaches
feasible?33
This Essay argues that a cause of action for IIED or for NIED
should play a significant role in moderating exorbitant pricing of
lifesaving drugs. Additionally, for real change to occur in the
market, lawyers should use class action rules on behalf of all
patients who are prescribed the particular drug.
Most
importantly, such cases should seek an injunction, to enjoin the
price increase for all patients taking the drug, in order to force a
collective bargaining by the patients to bring the cost to a
reasonable level.34
The advantage to using tort law, in
5.

Market depends on virtuous actors to moderate power and
greed;
6. The example of insurance and “bad faith.”
Professor Abraham concludes:
The character of the principle I discern in insurance law is one of
obligation resting on the nature and contemporary importance of
insurance, not resting on the consent and trust that are part of
governance. Few individuals trust their insurers or consent to
anything meaningful in connection with their purchase of
insurance. . . . [T]he principle is lurking in our law, and recognition
of the principle’s existence will enhance our understanding of what
insurance law is, and what insurance does.
Id. at 11-12.
32. See id.
33. JEB BARNES & THOMAS F. BURKE, HOW POLICY SHAPES POLITICS: RIGHTS,
COURTS, LITIGATION, AND THE STRUGGLE OVER INJURY COMPENSATION (Oxford
University Press ed., 2015)
34. In determining the best method of structuring a proposed class action
settlement, one of the first areas of inquiry may concern the rule under which the
settlement class will be certified. The most common options available consist of
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combination with certifying a class for settlement purposes, is
that such a combination would provide a forum for collective
bargaining between those who take the drug and the drug’s
manufacturer—a forum that is currently prohibited by private
insurance companies under antitrust law35 and Medicare insurers
under healthcare law.36 Litigation might be the best method to
bring about the collective bargaining forces that are needed to
ensure fair market pricing for life-saving drugs by providing for
direct bargaining between patients and the pharmaceutical
companies.
This Essay further employs the work of Jeb Barnes and
Thomas Burke to assist in understanding the advantages of using
an adversarial litigation approach to the problem of exorbitant

certification under Sections 23(b) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
or their equivalents under state rules of civil procedure. Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes
certification when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
that apply generally to the class, so that the final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(2). Certification under this Section is conditioned upon a determination that “the
court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). For settlement purposes, the primary advantage
of Rule 23(b)(2) is the mandatory nature of the class, which precludes class members
from opting out of the settlement. However, certification under this Rule is only
appropriate if the requested declaratory or injunctive relief predominates. Therefore,
most courts will limit monetary damages under such a class to those that are
“incidental” to the injunctive relief, such that the damages “flow directly from liability
to the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of the injunctive or declaratory
relief,” and are not dependent upon factors unique to each individual claim. Allison v.
Citgo Petroleum Co., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998). These limitations on monetary
damages often lead settling parties to favor certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) settlement
class, notwithstanding the potential for opt-outs.
35. The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides, in relevant part: “[T]he Sherman
Act . . . shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business
is not regulated by State Law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976). However, [t]o the extent a
state regulates such business by state law, the Sherman Act and other federal
antitrust laws are not applicable.” Crawford v. American Title Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 217,
218 (5th Cir. 1975).
36. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066. “In 2003, Congress and President Bush enacted
the “Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act,” which
established a prescription drug program for Medicare. The legislation expressly
prohibited Medicare from negotiating drug prices with pharmaceutical companies.
Rather, any negotiation that takes place is to be between pharmaceutical companies
and the insurance companies that administer the Medicare prescription drug
program.” David Hogberg, Letting Medicare ‘Negotiate’ Drug Prices: Myths vs. Reality,
NAT’L
CTR.
FOR
PUB.
POLICY
RESEARCH
(January
2007),
https://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA550MedicareDrugPrices.html.

ZWIER (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

10/22/2016 9:42 AM

HIGH PRICES FOR LIFE-SAVING DRUGS

211

drug prices over legislative or bureaucratic remedies.37 Their
analysis will aid in understanding why, if the courts recognize a
tort and certify a class of patients, the courts should fashion a
remedy not solely for Medicare patients,38 but should also use
their equitable powers to oversee a lowering of prices for all
patients.39 In additional, the analysis will assist in showing that
IIED or NIED may be the first step in providing a final remedy
for exorbitant pricing of a drug.40 Some may argue that courts are
notoriously ill-suited for the task of dealing with mass numbers of
claims involving patients with different financial, medical, and
insurance-related circumstances.41 However, in such cases, the
courts can most quickly and efficiently respond to individual cases
and provide remedies to groups of affected patients, while giving
legislatures time to sort out a price refereeing system that will
best balance market principles with compassion for the patients.
As a corollary to the Barnes and Burke analysis, this Essay
will show that, at the federal level, Medicare regulation
amendments to prohibit predatory pricing might not be the best
approach.42 While a Medicare approach may assist in guarding
against some predatory pricing, it will most likely contribute to

37.
38.
39.
40.

BARNES & BURKE, supra note 33, at 6-11.
Id.
Id.
Id. On the other hand, the state legislations seem caught in a race to the
bottom when it comes to business regulations. The problem is that high prices for goods
in high demand are a key feature of a free market, supported by basic beliefs that such
pricing leads to efficient development of breakthrough pharmaceuticals.
41. GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (Univ. of Chicago Press ed., 1991). See also David Partlett, Asbestos Wars:
In Three Parts, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 759, 763-64 (2014). On the other hand, there
is little evidence of the drawbacks to litigation that these critiques raise. BARNES &
BURKE, supra note 33, at 17. And, there are significant drawbacks, for patients, to
waiting for a legislative remedy for high-priced pharmaceuticals. First, there is the
impact of the Presidential campaign, and, second, there is the impact of Citizen’s
United, and the ability of money to capture the legislature and to delay remedies to
patients in the throes of losing life savings, fighting disease, and suffering emotional
distress.
42. Medicare Advantage (MA) and Prescription Drug (PD) plans are permitted to
participate in the Medicare Program pursuant to Sections 1857 and 1860D-12 of the
Social Security Act, and under regulations at 42 C.F.R., Section 422.500. If the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) denies an application to qualify as a MA or
PD plan, or takes adverse action (e.g., termination, non-renewal, intermediate
sanction) against an existing MA or PD plan, the applicant or existing plan is entitled
to request a hearing before a CMS Hearing Officer. 42 C.F.R. 422.660, 423.650 (2010).
Additionally, the CMS Hearing Officer’s decision may be reviewed by the CMS
Administrator. 42 C.F. R. §§ 423.666, 422.690 (2010).
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even higher prices for patients with private insurance plans.43
Antitrust prohibitions against insurance companies combining to
negotiate lower prices are at the center of this problem. In other
words, Medicare legislation will not keep separate patient groups
from pursuing multiple and divisive strategies that may pit one
drug user against another.
Instead, what is necessary—but not yet politically palpable—
is legislation similar to that used by Europe and Canada.44 The
U.S. needs a “price referencing system,” either used by the
government in a single payer system, or by an agency to address
the prices private insurers will pay for drugs. In the agency
context, the agency should use a price-referencing model, and
reimburse for life-saving drugs only in an amount that is
determined either by an “internal” price referencing system or in
reference to “external markets” of similar drug pricing for the
drugs. However, such solutions are not in our near future, and
the next best solution will be one developed through tort law. In
fact by educating the drug manufacturers and public of the harm
from exorbitantly priced life-saving drugs, can be an essential
force to drive the eventual enactment of price referencing
legislation for all drugs.45
Part II of this Essay examines the evolution of IIED, in order
to determine whether the actions of Turing and Valeant fit within
the prima facie elements of this tort. Next, Part III looks to NIED,
and examines whether this tort will provide a method of relief
against exorbitant pricing of life-saving drugs.46 The NIED
43. Hogberg, supra note 36.
44. Rugerri & Nolte, supra note 8.
45. As such, these cases present good case studies for considering the basic
assumptions behind free market principles, as well as the countervailing and virtuebased assumptions submerged in these torts, and the covenants of good faith and fair
dealing. Which of these hidden beliefs is stronger, or, which will be the winner in the
U.S. pricing of drugs? Perhaps there is a way for common law torts to help rebalance
the market equation.
46. What follows, then, will be what may look to some as a rather conventional
and outdated recapitulation of the case law that gave birth to the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Yet, as Robert Sokolowski has said in The
Science of Being as Being in Aristotle, Aquinasm, and Wipple:
Such rethinking, moreover, is not just a matter of reconfiguring
signs and symbols in a hermetically closed system; it is a response
to the way things are, but it is a response we make with the help of
others, those we recapitulate and those with whom we converse.
These other people will help us to see things and to understand what
they are; we do not just repeat what other people have said and we
do not just live in meanings and in opinions.
Robert, Sokolowski, The Science of Being as Being in Aristotle, Aquinasm, and Wipple,
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analysis also addresses the essential obligation imbedded in the
common law that everyone, including those who act in the
marketplace, must conduct themselves in a manner that will not
cause undue emotional harm. Part II concludes that there are
likely to be significant, but not insurmountable, hurdles to the
recognition of causes of action in common law torts.
Part IV begins by questioning whether class certification can
provide the means for patients to negotiate a lower price for their
drugs. The Part next addresses whether tort cases, combined
with class action certifications that seek injunctions, will likely
bring about a significant moderation of high prices for life-saving
drugs. Again, current law presents obstacles for patients seeking
remedies for high-priced drugs; but those obstacles are not
hopeless. Part IV uses the Barnes and Burke framework to
provide support for the use of class action certification and
equitable relief as important features of the litigation approach.
This framework will also be used to examine whether it would be
better to wait for legislation like that developed in other areas of
personal injury compensation.47 Part IV further considers
whether legislation that empowers Medicare to negotiate lower
prices is likely to lower such prices without creating unintended
pricing effects on the drug market as a whole.
Finally, Part V describes and employs a case study designed
to provide compensation for victims of outrageous business
practices. Using the history of bad faith insurance laws and
breach of covenants of good faith and fair dealing, this Part will
exhibit the advantages of a state-driven, integrated approach to
developing laws designed to remedy market improprieties. Part
V concludes that legislation patterned on bad faith insurance
legislation could help overcome the common law limitations to
tort class actions that might be raised by overly cautious courts.
Limiting exorbitant drug pricing can occur faster, fairer, and
more efficiently when courts are involved. Court decisions using
long-established doctrines of common law torts better remedy the
problem of exorbitant pricing of life-saving drugs. Additionally,
such court decisions avoid the problems inherent in waiting for
legislation. Finally, where courts utilize their equity powers, lifein 55 THE SCIENCE OF BEING AS BEING: METAPHYSICAL INVESTIGATIONS 9, 10 (Gregory
T. Doolan ed., 2012). This is the spirit with which I wish to explore the common law
development of IIED.
47. BARNES & BURKE, supra note 33 (describing different approaches taken to
Social Security Disability Insurance, Asbestos Injury Compensation, and Vaccine
Injury Compensation). Barnes and Burke conclude that there are advantages to using
adversarial litigation to shape policy for injury compensation. Id.
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saving drug pricing can occur without problems that result from
bureaucratic solutions. Therefore, while it may ultimately be
preferable to implement legislation of a federally moderated pricereferencing system, the better and more realistic approach in the
U.S. is for courts to take the lead in efforts to combat the harmful
effects of corporate greed.
II. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Since the mid-1940s, IIED has served as a limitation on
behavior at the extremes of marketplace activity.48 The key
elements of IIED require (1) proof of “extreme and outrageous
conduct” (2) that causes “severe emotional distress.”49
A. EVEN AS IIED EMERGED IT WAS USED TO DISCIPLINE
MARKET EXCESSES
Nickerson v. Hodges50 is one of the first cases to validate a
claim of IIED, specifically with respect to behavior directed at an
individual with an impairment. In Nickerson, Miss Nickerson,
who had been a patient in a mental asylum, was told by a fortune
teller that Miss Nickerson’s relatives had buried gold on a
particular man’s land.51 After the man welcomed Miss Nickerson
onto his property, she began to search for the gold.52 Shortly
thereafter, the man’s daughter and two of her acquaintances filled
a container with rocks and dirt and buried it on the premises with
the intention that Miss Nickerson would discover this “pot of
gold.”53 They also placed a note in the container, which stated
that it should not be opened for three days and to notify all heirs
of its existence.54 Miss Nickerson discovered the container that
had been placed into the property, took it to the bank, and notified
all heirs as the note instructed.55 Once all had gathered for the

48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); William L. Prosser, Intentional
Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 877 (1939); Daniel
Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 Colum. L. Rev.
42, 42 (1982).
49. See id.
50. 84 So. 37(La. 1920).
51. Id. at 37.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 38.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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opening of the container, it was opened and its contents
revealed.56 Immediately upon discovering that the container did
not contain gold, Miss Nickerson flew into a rage and threw
herself at one of the pranksters until she could be restrained.57
While the Nickerson court recognized that the entire incident
was a practical joke and that there was no serious, malicious
intent, it also recognized that the defendants knew Miss
Nickerson had at one time been a patient in a mental institution,
and the joke had severely humiliated her.58 The court ultimately
awarded Miss Nickerson’s estate damages for the emotional
distress that she had experienced.59
Nickerson provides us with a number of important insights.
First, the court found that a valid claim existed, despite the fact
that the defendants did not force Miss Nickerson to incur the costs
related to the time and expense to dig for the treasure. Further,
in addition to the costs incurred by the plaintiff, the court
awarded damages for the distress caused by the defendant, even
though the extreme nature of distress may have been caused by
the existing mental conditions of the plaintiff.60 The court’s
decision implicitly embraced a recognition of the common
vulnerability of persons with medical conditions.
One subset of IIED claims particularly analogous to the drug
pricing examples, are those involving bill collection companies
that attempt to induce debtors to pay their debts. For example,
in Public Finance Corp. v. Davis,61 the debtor sued for severe
emotional distress after a creditor, having been informed that the
debtor was in the hospital tending to her very ill daughter, called
the debtor at the hospital.62 In a well-reasoned dissent, Judge
Dooley detailed the extensive case law that supported a cause of
action for IIED where bill collectors used dunning tactics to coerce
payments.63 Judge Dooley, while admitting that the bill collector
had every right in the market to demand payment, declared that
its repeated and harassing phone calls and dunning letters
threatening the debtor with a prison sentence constituted
intentional conduct that warranted the label of “extreme and
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id.
360 N.E.2d 765 (Ill. 1976).
Id. at 768.
Id. at 770-71 (Dooley, J. dissenting).
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outrageous.”64
Many early IIED cases involved insurance companies that
recklessly denied coverage under their policies.65 Again, the
outrageousness of the conduct is in direct proportion to the
common vulnerability created by an insurance company that
wrongfully denies coverage in cases of fire, liability, or poor
health, and where the plaintiff may be forced to forgo basic needs
and services because of the company’s behavior. Therefore, where
defendant insurance company tries to avoid paying on a policy,
IIED is often paired with a cause of action for a breach of covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.66 For example, in Fletcher v.
Western Nat’l Life Ins. Co.,67 the defendants, an insurance
company and its claim adjuster, sent “false and threatening
letters” and “employ[ed] economic pressure” on the plaintiff in an
attempt to force the plaintiff to “surrender” his insurance policy.68
Although the defendants conceded that the conducted was
outrageous, they argued that the plaintiff’s emotional distress did
not rise to a sufficient level of severity to establish a valid claim
of IIED.69 The court disagreed, however, holding that the
resulting distress incurred by the plaintiff was sufficient to give
rise to a claim for IIED against the defendants.70
IIED exists even where the parties have entered into a
voluntary association with one another. Take for instance, the

64. Id. at 773.
65. The story of insurance bad faith claims in California begins with its Supreme
Court’s decision in Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (1958) (in
banc). In Comunale, the plaintiffs were injured by the defendant’s insured in an
automobile accident. Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958)
(in banc). The insurance policy had limits of liability in the sum of $10,000 for each
person injured and $20,000 for each accident. Id. The insurance company refused to
defend the action, arguing that the truck driven by the insured did not belong to him.
Id. The insured retained counsel to represent him. Id. On the second day of trial, the
plaintiffs indicated that they would settle the case for $4,000, and the insured
communicated this offer to the defendant, explaining that he did not have enough
money to effect the settlement. Id. The insurance company refused to settle, and the
trial proceeded to judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for a total of $26,250. Id. For an
excellent history of the development of the law of bad faith in California, see J. Clark
Kelso & Kari C. Kelso, Jury Verdicts in Insurance Bad Faith Cases, INSTITUTE FOR
LEGISLATIVE PRACTICE (1999).
66. See Fletcher v. Western Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 403 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1970).
67. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
68. Id. at 392.
69. Id. at 394.
70. Id.
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case of George v. Jordan Marsh Co.71 There, a company and its
employee were alleged to have badgered and harassed a woman
by “dunning tactics” in an attempt to intimidate the plaintiff into
paying her son’s debt to the company.72 The complaint further
alleged that such acts caused the plaintiff “great mental anguish
and emotional distress as intended by the defendant(s)” and that,
as a result thereof, the plaintiff’s health deteriorated and she
suffered a heart attack.73 Further, notwithstanding the woman’s
attorney’s request that the “harassing tactics be discontinued,”
the company persisted in its harassment, which caused the
woman to suffer even greater emotional distress that resulted in
a second heart attack.74 The court held that all such acts by the
company prevented the woman from enjoying gainful employment
and caused her to incur expenses for medicine, medical
attendance, and nursing.75
Perhaps most analogous to situations of exorbitant drug
pricing is the early IIED case of Rockhill v. Pollard.76 In Rockhill,
woman and her ten-month-old baby were injured in an automobile
accident.77 The baby appeared lifeless at the scene of the accident
and was rushed to a nearby hospital where the woman had to ask
a doctor several times to examine the baby.78 Although the doctor
finally agreed to examine the baby, all that he did was perform a
simple examination and tell the woman that there was nothing
wrong with her child.79 The woman took her baby to an entirely
different hospital where the baby was treated for shock and a
head injury.80 The doctor’s rude remarks, disdain, and disregard
for the feelings of the woman and her baby in Rockhill were
legendary.81 Important to the discussion in this Essay was the
doctor’s seeming indifference to the life-threatening situation
confronting the woman and her child. Despite the fact that the

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

268 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1971).
Id. at 916 (internal quotation omitted).
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Id.
Id.
485 P.2d 28 (Or. 1971).
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 30.
The doctor was impatient, hardly examined the child, and shrugged his
shoulders when questioned by the baby’s mother. He also made the woman wait with
her baby outside in below-freezing temperatures for someone to pick her up. See id. at
29-30.
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child fully recovered,82 the Rockhill court found that the
emotional distress inflicted upon the woman was severe enough
to warrant a new trial.83 In so holding, the court stated:
[The woman] must show not only that [the doctor’s]
conduct was outrageous, but also that she in fact
suffered emotional distress as a result, and that it was
severe. There is not much evidence on this point, but
it is direct and the court must take it as true. [The
woman], corroborated by her husband, testified that
as a result of [the doctor’s] behavior she became
nervous and had to take tranquilizers, and that her
nervousness caused sleeplessness and loss of appetite
over a considerable period of time up to the date of the
trial. [The doctor] belittles these symptoms, but it is
the distress which must be severe, not the physical
manifestations. Mental distress would have to be
more than mild and transitory in order to cause these
symptoms over a two-year period.84
Also among the early IIED cases is DiCicco v. Trinidad Area
Health Association,85 which involved a hospital administrator
who refused to provide emergency services to a patient. The
administrator, whose hospital provided the only ambulance in the
county, had refused to dispatch the ambulance unless the
patient’s doctor consented to having the patient sent to the
administrator’s hospital—not the hospital the doctor had deemed
best suited to treat the patient’s condition.86 Due to the
administrator’s refusal to send an ambulance, the doctor was
forced to request an ambulance from a location more than twenty
miles away, which resulted in substantial delay in transporting
the patient the hospital (where she died within one hour of
arrival).87 The patient’s husband thereafter sued the hospital
administrator and the operator of the ambulance service for
outrageous conduct arising from the patient’s death.88 The court
held that the defendants’ “refusal of ambulance service to the
critically ill [patient] on grounds irrelevant to her need for, or the
availability of the service. . . . “ could constitute extreme and
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 31.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 32-33 (internal citations omitted).
573 P.2d 559 (Colo. App. 1977).
Id. at 560-61.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 560.
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outrageous conduct.89 Finding the existence of a tort also fit
within the overall policies of intentional torts that, to deny
recovery creates the risk of a breach of peace and the risk of
violence—for without a remedy, plaintiffs will be tempted to take
the law into their own hands.90
B. DOES THE CONDUCT OF TURING AND VALEANT MEET
THE “EXTREME AND OUTRAGEOUS” STANDARD?
The parallels between the early IIED cases, discussed supra,
and the corporate conduct of Turing and Valeant are striking.
Prescription drugs, like the ambulance in DiCicco, are integral to
emergency medical treatment. The emergency nature of the
situation in DiCicco necessitated a level of care that is reasonably
under the circumstance, and the court was outraged that a
market actor would take advantage of the patient strictly due to
financial reasons. In medical emergencies, a price demand can
border on extortion and coercion, and belies the word “free” in free
market. DiCicco and the other cases provide, therefore, that
limits do exist on the extremes of free market behavior and such
limits are grounded in community reaction to the behavior—as
determined by a jury. It is not sufficient for the plaintiff to show
his individual reaction to the defendant’s behavior; the reaction
must also be shared by a jury. In examining the arguments made
by attorneys to juries, we can rediscover the reasoning behind
common law limitations on market excesses.
Perhaps most important—because it is a principle that
emerges from the appellate courts affirmance of jury findings—is
tort law’s special concern in emergency situations for the parent,
child, elderly, and mentally ill.91 What courts emphasize is that,
89. Id. at 562.
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§1-3 (AM. LAW. INST. 1998). The defenses to
intentional torts reflect the concern that individuals are likely to engage in violence
out of necessity, see Vincent v. Lake Erie, 124 N.W. 221, 222 (Minn. 1910); or for the
protection of life, see Courvoisier v. Raymond, 47 P. 284, 285 (Colo. 1896); or for the
protection of others, see id.; or defense of property, see Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d
657, 661 (Iowa 1971).
91. Prosser, supra note 48, 878-881. The Restatement (Second) of Torts offers an
illustration to explain this type of situation:
A, an eccentric and mentally deficient old maid, has the delusion
that a pot of gold is buried in her back yard, and is always digging
for it. Knowing this, B buries a pot with other contents in her yard,
and when A digs it up causes her to be escorted in triumph to the
city hall, where the pot is opened under circumstances of public
humiliation to A. A suffers severe emotional disturbance and
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while we are not all vulnerable to the ravages of disease, some of
us are more resilient than others.92 As a result of this distinction,
courts may be holding that our common vulnerability presents us
with the ability to recognize the outrageousness of conduct, and
the lack of resilience of particular populations (e.g., the young, the
old, the widow). In such cases, the courts describe a “golden”
thread. Marketplace behavior must moderate out a concern for
the vulnerability of all those in the throes of life-threatening
disease and, in particular, for those less resilient individuals who
will suffer the consequences of exorbitant pricing.
Second, a trial lawyer might present evidence that many
drugs may have been developed, in large part, through
government funding.93 There is something misleading, if not
deceitful, about the claim that high prices are necessary to cover
the costs of development. While increased prices may be
necessary to develop future drugs where government funding is
resulting illness. B is subject to liability to A for both.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f, illus. 9. This illustration is taken from
the Nickerson case. See supra notes 48-58, and accompanying text. The facts are
somewhat different from the Restatement’s illustration; in Nickerson there were
multiple defendants and the digging occurred on another’s property. Nevertheless, the
Nickerson court, many years before the Restatement’s 1948 amendment, found the
conduct actionable: The conspirators, no doubt, merely intended what they did as a
practical joke, and had no willful intention of injuring the lady. “However, the results
were quite serious indeed, and the mental suffering and humiliation must have been
quite unbearable, to say nothing of the disappointment and conviction, which she
carried to her grave some two years later.” Nickerson v. Hodges, 84 So. 37, 39 (La.
1920).
In support of the view that protecting the vulnerable is an important aim of tort law,
see John Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ.
L. REV. 789, 803 (2007); Jane Stapleton, The Golden Thread at the Heart of Tort Law:
Protection of the Vulnerable, in 44 CENTENARY ESSAYS FOR THE HIGH COURT OF
AUSTRALIA 242, 242-255 (Peter Cane ed., 2004); Carl F. Stychin, The Vulnerable
Subject of Negligence Law, Int’l J. L. Context 337, 345 (2012). See generally Martha
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008); STUDIES IN
FEMINIST THEORY, VULNERABILITY: NEW ESSAYS IN ETHICS AND FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY
(Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers, & Susan Dodds eds., 2013).
92. I am particularly grateful to my colleague, Martha Fineman, for her helpful
suggestions derived from her Vulnerability Theory. See Martha Albertson Fineman,
“Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of Individual and Societal
Responsibility, 20 U. ILL. ELDER L.J. 71, 92 (2012).
93. Bob Young & Michael Surrusco, RX R&D Myths: The Case Against the Drug
Industry’s
R&D
“Scare
Card”,
PUBLIC
CITIZEN
(July
2001),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACFDC.PDF. Cf. Ezekiel K. Emanuel, I Am Paying
for
Your
Expensive
Medicine,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
7,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/08/opinion/sunday/i-am-paying-for-your-expensivemedicine.html?emc=eta1&_r=1 (citing the example of PCSK0 inhibitors, which lower
the bad type of cholesterol, LDL, priced at $14,000 per year, developed by publically
funded research).
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not adequate, it was not necessary to the development of many of
the drugs that were at the center of the price explosion.
Next, a trial lawyer could argue that conduct is outrageous
when it takes advantage of government funding designed to
alleviate the suffering of those in need of life-saving drugs. This
“taking advantage” of government funding is “unjust
enrichment.”94 Note that unjust enrichment is the equitable
remedy provided against tobacco companies who used state
healthcare dollars to free ride in the market with the sale of
tobacco.95 It is nonetheless relevant to a jury determination of the
outrageous nature of the defendant’s conduct. Similar to tobacco
companies, the pharmaceutical companies externalize the costs of
their behavior onto other government programs.96 They depend
on tax-funded programs that lack the necessary market
protections in the case of life-saving medications,97 and price
them, not based on costs of development or special insights into
their development, but simply by buying up the patients and then
hoisting the costs onto the public as a whole.98 The companies are
enriched through their public use of funds, but it is to the
detriment of both the patient and the public at large.99 Moreover,
unjust enrichment will not only be important for understanding
the outrageousness of the behavior, it will also be particularly
important to understanding what remedies the court should
approve once a class action lawsuit has been authorized.
Finally, the common vulnerability of every member of the
community in life-threatening situations to the exorbitant pricing
schemes is what distinguishes the conduct as particularly
outrageous. It is not just certain populations, or those who do not
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM.
LAW INST. 2011) (“A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is
subject to liability in restitution.”). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT Foreword (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
95. But see Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi
Tobacco Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 Ga. L. Rev. 847, 848 (1999)
(Professor Rendleman has criticized the application of restitution to the tobacco
litigation). I am grateful for this insight from Professor Candace Kovacic-Fleischer,
who reviewed a copy of this article in connection with the Louisville Remedies Forum.
Professor Kovacic-Fleischer’s analysis of unjust enrichment, in connection with
Walmart’s use of wage and price strategies to keep their workers on food stamps is
simply brilliant.
96. Rockoff, supra note 27.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. Robert Kneller, The importance of new companies for drug discovery: origins
of a decade of new drugs, 9 NATURE REVIEWS: DRUG DISCOVERY 867, 873 (Nov. 2010).
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take care of themselves, or even a select minority population that
is at risk to these high prices. We will all face death, but we
potentially have our lives extended and their quality enhanced
through access to life-saving drugs. Whether for Cancer,100 high
blood pressure, heart attack, or Wilson’s disease, drugs will be
vital both to survival and to our quality of life. Our common
vulnerability is what helps expose the outrageous nature of the
pricing act, which has the potential to rob us all of our life’s
savings in times where we have little choice but to spend the
money. It could happen to any one of us—we are all vulnerable to
the practice.101
1. Intent Element
The intent element of IIED is met even without the existence
of a specific intent to cause harm to a particular person.102 Early
100. Andrew Pollock, Doctors Denounce Cancer Drug Prices of $100,000 a Year,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/business/cancerphysicians-attack-high-drug-costs.html?_r=0.
101. Let’s take a closer look at the concept of vulnerability and then determine if
it can help support a cause of action for IIED. Martha Fineman describes the
vulnerability thesis and its fundamental assertion as follows:
Often narrowly understood as merely “openness to physical or
emotional harm,” vulnerability should be recognized as the primal
human condition. As embodied beings, we are universally and
individually constantly susceptible to harm, whether caused by
infancy and lack of capacity, disease and physical decline, or by
natural or manufactured disasters. This form of dependency,
although episodic, is universally experienced and could be thought
of as the physical manifestation or realization of our shared
vulnerability as human persons, which is constant throughout the
life course. This realized form of human vulnerability has a social
or relational component, as well as physical implications, because
we are innately dependent on the provision of care by others when
we are infants and often when we are ill, aged, or disabled. In this
way, human vulnerability should be understood as providing the
compelling impetus for the creation of social relationships and
institutions, necessitating the formation of families, communities,
associations, and even political entities and nation-states. The
social roles defined by and through these relationships and
institutions are not universally experienced, nor are their functions
inevitable or inherent in the human condition. Rather, they are
socially constructed and contingent in nature; built and maintained
within institutions such as the family, the school, and the
workplace.
Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality and Difference – The Restrained State, 66 ALA.
L. REV. 609, 614 (2015) (internal citations omitted). I would also add “the hospital” to
Professor Fineman’s list of institutions.
102. Joseph H. King, The Torts Restatement’s Inchoate Definition of Intent for
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common law cases in intentional torts established these
principles, including the case of Vosburg v. Putney.103 In Vosburg,
the intent element was established for a battery claim despite the
dual intent nature of the defendant’s action, when the defendant
kicked the plaintiff to get the plaintiff’s attention—not to harm
the plaintiff.104 Additionally, in Garrett v. Dailey,105 intent was
again established even though the defendant’s action was meant
as a joke—moving the plaintiff’s chair as the plaintiff was sitting
down when the defendant knew “with substantial certainty” that
the plaintiff would hit the ground.106 Intent, therefore, can be
defined as general knowledge of unlawful contact, apprehension
of contact, imprisonment to a bounded area, or trespass to land,
despite a secondary lawful intent.107 Mistake is no defense.108
Moreover, the Restatement’s definition of IIED loosens the
intent requirement:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severer emotional
Battery, and Reflections on the Province of Restatements, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 623, 624
(2011).
103. 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891).
104. Id.
105. 304 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1956).
106. Id.
107. Joseph H. King, The Torts Restatement’s Inchoate Definition of Intent for
Battery, and Reflections on the Province of Restatements, 38 Pepp. L. Rev. 623, 624
(2011). King writes:
The new Restatement (Third) defines intent in its first section,
stating that “[a] person acts with the intent to produce a
consequence if . . . the person acts with the purpose of producing
that consequence; or . . . acts knowing that the consequence is
substantially certain to result.” This definition is an umbrella one,
providing an all-inclusive definition of what it means to “intend”
something. It simply defines the state of mind needed to support a
finding that a defendant intended “something” as a “consequence.”
But, before a person may be determined to have entertained the
necessary intent for a specific tort, we have to also know what
“consequence” must have been intended for that tort. The Section 1
definition does not address that aspect of intent—the nature of the
“consequence” that must have been intended to support various
traditional torts that require intent, such as battery. Rather, for
the present, it expressly defers to the Restatement (Second) sections
that address the substantive details and elements of those torts.
The comments state that the “Restatement (Second), Torts, remains
largely authoritative in explaining the details of the specific torts
encompassed by this Section and in specifying the elements and
limits of the various affirmative defenses that might be available.”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
108. Id.
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distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other
results from it, for such bodily harm.109
The comments to the Restatement elaborate on this point:
The rule stated in this section applies where the actor
desires to inflict severe emotional distress, and also
where he knows that such distress is certain or
substantially certain, to result from his conduct. It
applies also where he acts recklessly . . . in complete
disregard of a high degree of probability that the
emotional distress will follow.110
In other words, hospitals and pharmaceutical companies
should be treated just as those employers who, without sufficient
policies to prevent race discrimination and sexual harassment,
are found liable for IIED, despite their lack of specific intent to
cause a plaintiff emotional distress.111
Where corporate
executives describe market strategies that show intent to take
advantage of the patients’ need for the drugs in order to coerce
exorbitant prices, they have shown the necessary intent and the
knowledge, with “substantial certainty,” needed to fulfill the
intent element.112
2. Severe Emotional Distress
While the “outrage” element of IIED is met in these cases, the
“severe emotional distress” element may be more difficult for a
plaintiff to establish. Commentators have noted that the more
egregious the conduct by the institution, the less it is required to
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965) (emphasis
added).
110. Id. cmt. i.
111. Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment
At Will: The Case Against ‘Tortification’ of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L.
REV. 387, 392 (1994). Tort doctrine has difficulty with imposing vicarious liability for
intentional torts. Yet there are examples of vicarious liability for employees’ bad faith
decisions on behalf of insurance companies: sexual harassment and quid pro quo sex
by managers, beatings by bouncers, and hazing by sports players, to name a few. The
key ingredient in imposing liability is notice to the institution of the employee’s
behavior—something evidenced by the pharmaceutical company’s board in its pricing
and profit projection reports.
112. Andrew Pollack, Martin Shkreli’s Arrest Gives Drug Makers Cover, N.Y.
Times (Dec. 18, 2015). Pollack reports a twitter post from Skreli where he admits to
knowing that some people may not be able to afford the drug: “If you can afford our
drugs with insurance, great. . . . If you can’t you can have it for free. Our system
works.”
Id. (quoting @MartinShkreli, TWITTER (Dec. 16, 2015, 10:24 AM),
https://twitter.com/MartinShkreli/status/677192472490065920).
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establish physical manifestations of the harm.113 Even then,
subsequent decisions show just how difficult it is for plaintiffs to
prove this element.
For example, in Figueiredo-Torres v.
Nickel,114 the court denied a motion to dismiss but noted that the
plaintiff would face significant obstacles in establishing the
severity of the emotional distress and whether it had been
proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct.115 To further
illustrate, in Figueiredo-Torres, a marriage counselor told the
plaintiff to take some time away from his wife, all while engaging
in his own sexual relationship with the wife.116 The plaintiff’s wife
subsequently left him, and he sued the marriage counselor,
claiming the events had caused him to seek counseling and
affected his ability to enter into future intimate relationships.117
The court held that, to sort out the cause of the plaintiff’s distress
(whether from the end of his marriage or the behavior of the
counselor) would be the plaintiff’s burden to prove.118
In Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden,119 a young black man was falsely
accused of theft by his white employers, and wrongfully detained
in a dark room of the business for hours until he agreed to confess
to stealing money.120 Just as with the aforementioned cases, the
Bowden court found it difficult to accept the young man’s proof of
“severe emotional distress.”121 Despite the fact that the young
man testified to being worried and distraught, as well as
ashamed, the court agreed with the lower court’s decision that the
emotional distress suffered by the young man did not “meet the
standards” of the tort of IIED.122
Since Bowden, there have been few cases in the U.S. finding
IIED, alone, as a basis for liability.123 However, IIED has had
potency as a ride along, or parasitic, tort in the areas of labor and

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 826-27 (WEST GROUP ed., 2000).
584 A.2d 69 (Md. 1991).
Id. at 77.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id. at 74.
625 A.2d 959 (Md. 1993).
Id. at 961.
Id. at 964.
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
See Erica Goldberg, Emotional Distress, 47 CONN. L. REV. 809, 824 (2015)
(Describing resistance to “stand alone” emotional distress cases that are not parasitic
to other economic losses) [hereinafter Emotional Duties].
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employment law,124 defamation,125 and privacy.126 IIED works
best when it accompanies a legislative cause of action that
evidences a public policy to protect against emotional distress.
Accordingly, we turn to the question of whether the common law
already provides public policy support for preventing purposefully
inflicted, if not intentionally inflicted, emotional distress.
III. EXPLORING NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS AS A COMPANION TORT
As noted in Goldberg’s seminal article on emotional distress,
the conduct involved in cases at the extreme of free market
practices can often be analyzed under both negligence and
IIED.127 Some courts may balk at seeing enough of a specific
intent to harm individual patients and feel uncomfortable with
the intent element being met. In anticipation of such a reaction,
this Essay next examines whether a cause of action for NIED
provides companion support for recovery by a patient in an
exorbitant pricing case.
This Part first summarizes the tort duties to “rescue,” or to
come to the aid of, another, as well as the limitations on those
duties of protection of others from emotional harms. The Part
then examines exceptions to those exceptions, located in cases
involving direct breaches of duty to specifically identifiable
plaintiffs, which, in turn, cause emotional harm. Part A. begins
with an overview of tort law affirmative duty. Again, tort law
provides a well-grounded basis for courts to conclude that a class
of patients has been subjected to a tort: NIED from defendants’
pricing practices.
A. CURRENT LAW
First, a quick overview of tort law concerning affirmative
duty.128 One paradox in this area of law is that it recognizes
124. Duffy, supra note 111, at 392.
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 47 (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
126. Eugene Volokh, Evolution of the Duty of Care: Some Thoughts, 114 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 24 (2014).
127. Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 56 (1982).
128. What is immediately apparent is that tort law appears to contain a number
of paradoxes regarding the way it views and judges human nature. Its goals are both
to provide compensation and encourage risk-taking. It requires only reasonable
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individuals as responsible for their own actions and safety.129
However, affirmative duty also recognizes that much of what
happens to people is a product of other causes, whether natural or
simply accidental.130 In situations where a plaintiff could not
have taken reasonable precautions, affirmative duty may demand
compensation from a defendant, but only where there exists proof
that the defendant’s actions are the cause of the harm to a
plaintiff.131 And, while affirmative duty provides for the freedom
to act (so long as that act does not cause harm),132 it only requires
that a person take action to prevent harm where there exists a
special relationship to the one injured,133 to a person whose acts
they have a duty to control,134 or where there is a direct and
immediately foreseeable harm that would result from the failure
to act.135
In some jurisdictions, affirmative duty provides judges with
the responsibility to find affirmative duties in new situations and
relationships.136 For example, some state courts have ruled that
food and drug retailers have a duty to inspect their products and
to protect their customers from injury.137 In other cases (in
California, in particular), courts have placed the responsibility of
imposing affirmative duties with juries.138 The modern majority
rule is that judges are to make duty determinations in individual
cases.139 Professor Leon Green, known to many as the “Dean of
Tort Law,” points out the confusing state of this element in tort
doctrine:
How does the stating of the problem in terms of duties
enable a judge to pass judgment? Where shall he [or
she] find the source of duties? Do judges find them
ready made? Do they assume them? Do they create

behavior, but demands compensation where the injured is innocent. It sees cause as
requiring only cause in fact and yet only counts causes it determines to be “legal” or
“proximate.”
129. Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014,
1024 (1928).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 397 (1852).
138. See supra notes 65-67.
139. Green, supra note 129, at 1024.
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them, and if so, do they create them in wholesale, or
must each court create a particular duty which fits the
particular case before it? So far as I have been able to
discover, the common law courts have stumbled
through the whole period of their existence without
committing themselves on this inquiry. Perhaps it is
a subject which is not to be talked about. We are
clearly dealing with the very processes by which law is
generated. And doubtless the questions as to the
paternity of these duties brought forth in case after
case is embarrassing enough at best.140
Judges often answer the duty question by establishing that,
absent a special relationship between the actor and plaintiff, and
absent specific foreseeability of injury, there is no duty to act
where the defendant has “not acted,” and the case, therefore, is
one of nonfeasance.141 Where the defendant’s actions cause harm,
that defendant’s acts are judged according to the “reasonably
prudent person” standard.142
Justice Holmes is one of the prime defenders of the fault
principle in tort law: to be liable in tort, the defendant must be “at
fault” or “blameworthy.”143 Inherent to fault, Homes finds, is that
the defendant must have acted.144 Holmes, as the originator and
defender of this nonfeasance misfeasance division of tort law,145
makes four arguments for the fault principle: (1) the general
principle of law is that people are free to act in society and loss
from an accident must lay where it falls, and its corollary, that
state interference that shifts responsibility absent active fault is
an evil when it cannot be shown to be good;146 (2) the words
commonly associated with fault require the person to act, and the
term “act” implies choice;147 (3) the public generally profits from
individuals acting;148 and (4) to impose liability without an act, or
fault, would violate a sense or common intuition of justice.149
On the other hand, common intuitions or senses of justice
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id.
OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW AND OTHER WRITINGS 94-96
(Univ. Press 1881) (emphasis added).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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also argue in favor of imposing liability even where the defendant
has not been said to have acted.150 As many first year torts
students learn in their casebooks, we are to put our own intuitions
for justice and morality on hold when it comes to imposing liability
for nonfeasance.151
It turns out that it is more difficult to distinguish acts of
misfeasance and acts of nonfeasance in the real world. For
example, if a person is involved in a car accident where one car
pulls out in front of a driver who has the right of way, the problem
for the driver can be framed as the driver’s driving too fast for the
conditions, driving negligently, the driver’s failure to stop in time,
or his failure to keep a proper look out, depending on the
conditions. If framed the first way, the act is said to be
misfeasance, and if framed the second way it is said to be
nonfeasance.152 Is the distinction then arbitrary? Commenting
on the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, Justice
Cardoza stated:
It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act,
even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject
to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all. The
plaintiff would bring its case within the orbit of that
principle. The hand once set to a task may not always
be withdrawn with impunity though liability would
fail if it had never been applied at all. A time-honored
formula often phrases the distinction as one between
misfeasance and non-feasance.
Incomplete the
formula is, and so at times misleading. Given a
relation involving in its existence a duty of care
irrespective of a contract, a tort may result as well
from acts of omission as of commission in the
fulfillment of the duty thus recognized by law. What
we need to know is not so much the conduct to be
avoided when the relations and its attendant duty are

150. Feminists argue for such a duty. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on
Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 4 (1988).
151. Commentators are often quoted in trying to defend and socialize the lawyer
into accepting the nonfeasance distinction as being the right one, including James
Ames, Richard Epstein, and Richard Posner (who is brought in to explore the morality
of a duty to rescue rule). See, e.g., Marcia M. Ziegler, Comment, Nonfeasance and the
Duty to Assist: The American Seinfeld Syndrome, 104 DICK. L. REV. 525, 528 (2000);
Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 194 (1973);
Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the “Hand Formula”, 4
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 145, 150-51 (2003).
152. See Bender, supra note 150, at 4.
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established as existing. What we need to know is the
conduct that engenders the relation. It is here that
the formula, however incomplete, has its value and
significance. If conduct has gone forward to such a
stage that inaction would commonly result, not
negatively merely in withholding a benefit, but
positively or actively in working an injury, there exists
a relation out of which arises a duty to go forward. . . .
The query always is whether the putative wrongdoer
has advanced to such a point as to have launched a
force or instrument of harm, or has stopped where
inaction is at most a refusal to become an instrument
for good.153
Individualism had its limitations in particular acts that the
defendant may have taken, and the particular relationships the
actor may have been in at the time.154 In other words, driving a
car might, by itself, put a person in a relationship with other
drivers on the road, just as in maritime law, where ship captains
owed duties to help other ships based on the commonality of their
endeavors.155
In spite of the push for individualism, the common law has
developed significant exceptions to the “no duty” rule. First, an
exception exists where an individual stands in an already
recognized or special relationship with the plaintiff or victim (e.g.,
a school teacher and a child in that teacher’s class).156 The second
exception is where an individual stands in a special relationship
with a person they have a duty to control (e.g., parent controlling
their child from harming another child).157 The third exception
most specifically involves application of the “Good Samaritan”
ideal.158 This ideal implicates the creation of a duty where a
person has special knowledge of the potential for harm to a
153. H.R. Moch Co., Inc., v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898 (N.Y. App.
1928) (internal quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted). Justice Cardoza goes
on to hold that a contract for providing a city water did not give rise to a duty to the
citizens individually. Id. at 899.
154. See Bender, supra note 148, at 4.
155. See id.
156. Thomas J. Murphy, Affirmative Duties in Tort Following Tarasoff, 58 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 492, 507 (1984).
157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 1965); F.
H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV.
217, 219-21 (1908); Fowler V. Harper & P.M. Kline, The Duty to Control the Conduct
of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886, 886 (1934); McNiece & Thornton, Affirmative Duties in
Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272, 1287-88 (1949).
158. See McNiece & Thornton, supra note 157, at 1287-88.
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particular person and a concomitant obligation (where little
burden, cost, or damage exists) to come to the aid of that person.159
B. THE “GOOD SAMARITAN EXCEPTION”
The aforementioned “Good Samaritan” exception is
represented in three relevant California cases, which arose out of
a foreseeability of harm: (1) Tarasoff v. Regents of the University
of California,160 (2) Thompson v. County of Alameda,161 and (3)
Saldono v. O’Daniels.162 Each case is discussed in more detail
below.
1. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California
In October 1969, Proenjit Poddar (Poddar) murdered Tatiana
Tarasoff (decedent).163 The decedent’s parents (the Tarasoffs)
brought suit against the University of California, where Poddar
had been seeing a therapist. The Tarasoffs contended that, only
a short time prior to decedent’s murder, Poddar had expressed, in
a session with his therapist (employed by the University of
California), that he planned to kill decedent.164 The Tarasoffs
alleged that although the therapist had notified campus police of
Poddar’s intentions, the police released Poddar after only briefly
detaining him.165 The parents asserted two grounds for their
action: (1) the failure to confine Poddar despite his expressed
intention to kill decedent, and (2) the failure to warn decedent or
her parents of Poddar’s intentions.166 The University of California
maintained that it owed no duty of care to the decedent, and that
it was immune from suit.167
The court held that the University therapist had a duty to
warn based on his knowledge that Poddar was likely to carry out
his threat against decedent, and that this duty was breached
when only the police, not decedent were notified.168 This holding
was made in spite of the fact that the therapist lacked the legal
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980).
190 Cal. Rptr. 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339.
Id.
Id. at 339-40.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id.
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ability to control the acts of Poddar.169 At the most, the
University’s duty to decedent rode parasitic to its duty to Poddar,
the patient. Tarasoff, therefore, is widely viewed as support for
the proposition that a legal duty can arise out of the foreseeability
of harm to a third party.
2. Thompson v. County of Alameda
In Thompson, James, a juvenile offender, had been in the
custody of the County and confined in an institution for a prior
incident.170 The County was aware that James had “latent,
extremely dangerous and violent propensities regarding young
children and that sexual assaults upon young children and
violence connected therewith were a likely result of releasing
[him] into the community.”171 The County was also aware that
James had specifically stated that if he were released, he would
“take the life of a young child residing in the neighborhood” where
James lived.172 Despite the knowledge of James’ intentions, the
County released him on temporary leave into his mother’s custody
at her home,173 and never advised the parents of the young
children in the neighborhood of James’ statements and threats.174
Within twenty-four hours of his release, James murdered a young
boy in the neighborhood.175
The court in Thompson distinguished Tarasoff on the basis
that James’ threat, as opposed to Poddar’s, was not directed at
any particular person,176 and, therefore, was not sufficiently
“foreseeable” to give rise to a duty to warn.177 In his dissent,
Justice Tobriner argued that the holding in Tarasoff was not
dependent on the knowledge of a particular victim, but was
dependent on foreseeability of harm to a person.178
In any event, it is important to note that, in cases where
pharmaceutical companies are selling to patients, they may
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Thompson, 614 P.2d at 72.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 76-77 (“Although the intended victim as a precondition to liability need
not be specifically named, he must be ‘readily identifiable.’”) (internal citation
omitted).
178. Id. at 81-82.
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already be in a relationship that gives rise to a duty of care,
(unless with each prescription, the duty ends when the medicine
is consumed). Therefore, these companies must provide warning
of the harmful effects of their drugs,179 and may have a duty to
pull their drugs from the market should they learn of drug defects
that exist.180 In other words, these pharmaceutical companies
already have duty of care, and the question is whether such duty
covers action that cause emotional harm. The importance of an
existing relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff was
made clear in Soldano.
3. Soldano v. Daniels
In Soldano, a Good Samaritan entered a public
establishment and asked an employee if he could use the
telephone to call the police when a patron at a nearby saloon had
been threatened.181 The employee refused, and a man was
subsequently shot and killed at the saloon.182 The daughter of the
victim sued the public establishment for wrongful death, alleging
that the establishment owed a legal duty to the victim, and that
the establishment breached that duty when its employee refused
access to the telephone.183 The court held that a duty did exist for
the for-profit, public establishment to come to the aid to someone
in danger.184
Thus, in the case of a pharmaceutical company selling a drug,
which, by its nature, is used to prevent a medical emergency from
occurring, the duty must be stronger than one that runs between
a public establishment and the public. In a pharmaceutical drug
situation, there is no dispute about the nature of the emergency,
the foreseeability of harm, or the identity of those who will be
harmed by exorbitant pricing. The harm is to everyone who is
faced with the choice of whether or not they should purchase the
drug.
179. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11 (Am.
Law Inst. 1997).
180. See M. Stuart Madden, Modern Post-Sale Warnings and Related Obligations,
27 PACE L. FAC. PUBLICATIONS 33, 57 (2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 13(a)(I), (2) (Am. Law Inst. 1997). Section 13(b) provides indicia
for determining whether “[a] reasonable person in the position of the successor would
provide a warning.” Id.
181. Soldano, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 317.
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In Soldano, the California Supreme Court found that, a legal
duty, which corresponded with a moral duty, was at the heart of
what the common law is meant to provide.185 The court further
quoted from Francis Bohlen’s article, The Moral Duty to Aid
Others as a Basis of Tort Liability:
Nor does it follow that because the law has not as yet
recognized the duty to repair harm innocently
wrought, that it will continue indefinitely to refuse it
recognition. While it is true that the common law does
not attempt to enforce all moral, ethical, or
humanitarian duties, it is, it is submitted, equally true
that all ethical and moral conceptions, which are not
the mere temporary manifestations of a passing wave
of sentimentalism or puritanism, but on the contrary,
find a real and permanent place in the settled
convictions of a race and become part of the normal
habit of thought thereof, of necessity do in time color
the judicial conception of legal obligation. . . . While
courts of law should not yield to every passing current
of popular though, nonetheless, it appears inevitable
that unless they adopt as legal those popular
standards which they themselves, as men, regard as
just and socially practicable, but which, as judges,
they refuse to recognize solely because they are not the
standards of the past of Brian, of Rolle, of Fineux, and
of Coke; they will more and more lose their distinctive
common law character as part of the machinery
whereby free men do justice among themselves.186
The Soldano court concluded, citing Rowland v. Christian:
We turn now to the concept of duty in a tort case. The
Supreme Court has identified certain factors to be
considered in determining whether a duty is owed to
third persons.
These factors include: “the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the
closeness of the connection between the defendant’s
conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame
attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to
the defendant and consequences to the community of
185. See id. at 312-13.
186. Id. at 313 (quoting Francis Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis
of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 316 (1908)).
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imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.”187
Soldano stands for the common law’s recognition of the
relationship between moral duty and legal duty. It reminds other
courts that they are not powerless to act to address the emotional
harm caused by the reckless and amoral reasoning of the market.
C. DUTY TO AID OTHERS AND PROTECTION FROM
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
While emotional distress damages are awarded in cases
where there is physical harm, courts have raised the proof
requirements in order for plaintiffs to recover in cases where
harm is solely emotional.188 Accordingly, where there is a claim
for NIED, the plaintiff typically must prove that his emotional
distress is a result of some contemporaneous sensory
observation,189 or that he was in the zone of danger or target
zone,190 in relation to harm caused to a close family member.
Otherwise, a flood of litigation may result.191 A court may also be
wary that the claimed emotional distress was faked, or that it was
not as substantial as claimed.192
Yet, the practice of exorbitant drug pricing fits nicely into an
exception to these cases, because patients’ emotional distress does
not depend on harm to others (though family members might
share in the emotional distress), it is based on harm that is
undoubtedly experienced by the patients themselves. As such,
these cases are more akin to NIED cases involving emotional
distress based on instances such as the misreporting of medical
conditions or death,193 the mishandling of dead bodies by a funeral
187. Soldano, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 315 (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,
113 (Cal. 1968), superseded by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 847 (West 1985), as recognized
in Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 18 Cal. 4th 714 (1998).
188. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 6 cmt. f;
Kircher, supra note 91, at 806.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 828 (Cal. 1989); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d
912, 915 (Cal. 1968); Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 524 (Cal.
1963), overruled by Dillon v. Legg 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). See Richard N. Pearson,
Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm – A Comment on the
Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 506 (1982).
192. Aaron Smith, The 9/11 fund: Putting a price on life, CNN MONEY (Sept. 7,
2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/06/news/economy/911_compensation_fund/.
193. James C. Maroulis, Can HIV-Negative Plaintiffs Recover Emotional Distress
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home or hospital,194 or distress suffered by an insured as a result
of a bad faith denial of his or her insurance claim.195 Additionally,
as described above, a patient enters into a relationship with a
drug manufacturer once that patient is prescribed a drug by their
doctor, and takes that drug under an existing price. Indeed, the
price hike might occur in the midst of an ongoing treatment where
the doctor’s prescription includes regular refills.
If the
manufacturer learns of a defect in the drug that is not known to
consumers, then that manufacturer clearly has a pre-existing
duty to warn the consumers about the defect.196 Where there is a
pre-existing duty, formed by a relationship that exists between
market actor and patient, the cause of action does not depend on
the plaintiff’s relationship to others, it depends on the actor’s
relationship to its patient-customer. Moreover, where the
emotional distress rides parasitic to the direct economic harm
suffered, the requirements of NIED are most likely satisfied.197
Assuming a colorable and plausible claim can be made by a
particular plaintiff for either IIED or NIED, it must next be
determined whether a class action might be brought on behalf of
all those plaintiffs who are taking the drug. If such a class could
be certified, there would be obviously significant advantages to
those patients bargaining for a lower priced drug. And, with the
certified class subsequently garnering the attention of the
pharmaceutical company, the company would be able to
sufficiently lower its exposure to continuing distress claims by
lowering its price of the drug (and whatever punitive damages
that might otherwise be justified). One might expect that a price
increase for a particular drug would create enough commonality
Damages for Their Fear of AIDS? 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 225 (1993).
194. See, e.g., Wilson v. Houston Funeral Home, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 169, 173 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (involving a mortician’s contract to prepare a body for burial that was
negligently performed, causing emotional distress)
195. See, e.g., Olson v. Rugloski, 277 N.W.2d 385, 387-88 (Minn. 1979) (finding an
insurer’s liability for refusal to pay benefits includes liability for lost profits that are a
direct and proximate result of breach).
196. Canto v. Ametek, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 873, 878 (Mass. 1985). See also
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 10 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1997)
(“Courts recognize that warnings about risks discovered after sale are sometimes
necessary to prevent significant harm to persons and property.”). See generally
Michael L. Matula, Manufacturer’s Post-Sale Obligations in the 1990’s, 32 TORT & INS.
L.J. 87, 87-88 (1996).
197. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 820 (Cal. 1980) (en
banc) (“We agree that the unqualified requirement of physical injury is no longer
justifiable.”). See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 334-35 (4th
ed. 1971). (noting that duty and breach are essential elements of a negligence cause of
action).
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of injury to allow each patient to qualify as a member of a class.
On the other hand, defendants would be quick to arguer that,
where some patients’ insurance plans cover the drugs regardless
of the price, there is little in the way of emotional distress that
would allow patients whose plans cover the drug regardless of the
price or where Medicare plans provide coverage to claim injuries.
Without injury, there is no standing.198
Again, the element for damages under a claim for NIED can
be proved through the same arguments we see made in IIED
cases. The proof of damages is found in the reckless indifference
for delivering price hike information to patients in the throes of
fighting life-threatening diseases.199 In addition, just as with
negligent delivery of misinformation to loved ones concerning the
death of a family member, proof of distress can be presumed as
growing out of both the common vulnerability concerning news
about death and the lack of resilience, in particular, experienced
by those left behind. Further, the “physical” harm threatened by
disease, itself, along with the threat to receiving lifesaving
medication, puts patients and their loved ones squarely in the
“zone of danger.”200
As we will see, commonality of the distress caused should be
sufficient for class certification, at least for the purpose of
negotiating a lower price, and might be sufficient to provide the
adequate incentive for an adequate remedy.201 This is especially
true where cases involve a defendant’s takeover of existing drugs
and their subsequent changes in pricing. These cases might also
seek to enjoin the price increase on the basis of Rule 65 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits injunctions in
cases where there exists a burden to the plaintiffs in excess of that
on the defendant, and where an adequate remedy at law cannot
be obtained.202 Before getting to the question of remedy, however,
198. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (“To establish an
Art. III case or controversy, a litigant must first clearly demonstrate that he has
suffered an ‘injury in fact.’”).
199. Pollack & Tavernise, supra note 1.
200. See Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1300 (Mass. 1978).
201. For example, in cases brought by individuals against banks for data breaches
(invasions of privacy), some courts have held that, where there is no showing of harm,
there is no foul. Alan Charles Raul & Edward McNicholas, Federal Court of Appeals
Dismisses Data Breach Class Action Following Hack of Bank’s Marketing Web Site,
PRIVACY
&
DATA
SECURITY
L.J.
(Oct.
2007),
available
at
http://www.sidley.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2007/10/Federal%20Court%20of%2
0Appeals%20Dismisses%20Data%20Breach%20C__/Files/View%20PDF/FileAttachm
ent/Pisciotta.
202. FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
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these cases will be able to obtain price relief if they are able to get
over the hurdle of class certification.
IV. CLASS ACTIONS, OR WAIT FOR LEGISLATION?
A. CLASS ACTIONS CAN LEAD TO PRICE REDUCTIONS.
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) is the
starting point in any analysis of class action lawsuits.203 To
qualify as a class action under FRCP 23, the case must satisfy the
four prerequisites of Rule 23(a): (1), numerosity, (2) commonality,
(3) typicality, and (4) adequacy.204 Federal case law is fairly
liberal in finding the four prerequisites under Rule 23(a)
requirements.205 As a result, it is usually difficult for the
defendant to satisfy these requirements.206
A defendant’s use of Rule 23(b), however, presents plaintiffs
with more significant challenges. In addition to satisfying all
requirements under Rule 23(a), federal class actions require that
plaintiffs satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b). The majority of
class actions seek certification pursuant to Rule 23(b), which
states, in part:
[T]he court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that
a class action is superior to other available methods
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.
Additionally, Rule 23(b)(3) provides that the matters pertinent to
the findings include:
[T]he class members’ interests in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already begun by or
against class members; the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; and the likely

203. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
204. Janet Cooper Alexander, An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the
United States (2000), from Conference, Debates Over Group Litigation in Comparative
Perspective,
available
at
https://www.law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classactionalexander.pdf.
205. Id. at 4.
206. Id.
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difficulties in managing a class action.207
Amassing the damages claims of a large number of class
members supports a claim for a large amount of attorney’s fees,
and poses a severe financial threat to a defendant.208 Thus,
plaintiffs often focus on a defendant’s arguments opposing
proposed Rule 23(b)(3) classes.209 Most states have rules that
parallel Rule 23.210 Additionally, most state supreme courts
interpret those rules by following the federal decisions that
interpret Rule 23.211
B. CLASS ACTION CHALLENGES
In order for the advantages of using tort law to address the
problem of exorbitant drug prices, there remains the question of
whether the courts will also permit all users of a particular drug—
subject to the price increases—to join as a class for the purposes
of pursuing a remedy.212 The court may balk at certification of a
class because it might not view state tort law across jurisdictions
as being adequately uniform, to make for a common question of
law.213 In addition, a court may not view each patient as being
able to establish the level of “severe emotional distress” required
to be successful in pursuing the remedy. Some patients may be
covered by Cadillac insurance plans, some may end up paying
substantially less out-of-pocket because of their insurance plans,
or because of the amount covered by Medicare or backed by
Medicaid. Some patients, on the other hand, may simply be
oblivious to the cost of the drugs. These variations may, in effect,
cause the common questions of law to fail the predominance
requirement.
207. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D).
208. Alexander, supra note 204.
209. Caroline H. Gebtry, American Bar Association: Corporate Counsel CLE
Seminar, A Primer On Class Certification Under Federal Rule 23 (Feb. 16, 2014),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/201
4_corporate_counselcleseminar/b2_2_a_primer_class_certification_under_federal_rul
e.authcheckdam.pdf.
210. CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1753.1
(Thomson West ed. 2009).
211. Id.
212. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D).
213. Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997). Alexander, supra
note 204, at 4. I hope that the foregoing analysis alleviates these concerns by showing
the cause of action exists and has common requirements in all fifty states. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (Am. Law Inst. 1965).
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While the above variations may present significant
challenges to plaintiffs, the unity of the legal question presented
and the equity of allowing for the collective bargaining of the
patient group for a reasonable price should overcome these
objections.214 The courts have done as much in consumer rights
cases,215 civil rights cases,216 asbestos cases,217 various medical
device cases (silicone breast implants as the most prominent
example),218 and products liability cases (including cases
involving Volkswagen and General Motors).219
After the famous Wal-Mart case,220 where 1.5 million female
employees accused Wal-Mart of discrimination against women in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and where
the Supreme Court denied class certification for failure of proof
that individual employment decisions were motivated by
discrimination, the issue in most class certifications may come
down to expert testimony on the issue of damages.221 Such
instances could involve a Daubert challenge222 on whether an
expert can provide sufficient support that a portion of the class
experienced significant emotional distress due to the actions of
the defendant.223 This hurdle, however, can be met by an expert
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Alexander, supra note 204, at 5-10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REV. 457, 457-510

(1999).
219. In re: Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” MDL, 15-MD-2672-CRB (JSC), available at
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/crb/vwmdl; In re: General Motors LLC Ignition Switch
Litigation, Case No. 1:14-md-02543-JMF, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York.
220. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011).
221. See id.
222. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
223. Id. Support for this approach comes from court holdings in analogous cases in
England and Australia. See Andrews and Ors v. Australia & New Zealand Banking
Group Ltd. [2012] HCA 30, available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/cases/case_m482012?Itemid=62&qh=YToxOntpOjA7czozOiJhbnoiO30%3D. It appears two cases
before the United Kingdom Supreme Court involved the issue of genuine pre-estimate
damages and were heard in July 2015. See ParkingEye Ltd. v. Beavis (2015) (UKSC);
Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Talal El Makdessi (2015) (UKSC). The court in
ParkingEye. agreed with the owners of the Riverside Retail Park to manage the car
park at the site. ParkingEye Ltd. (2015) (UKSC) [119]. ParkingEye displayed
numerous notices throughout the car park, saying that a failure to comply with a twohour time limit would “result in a Parking Charge of £85.” Id. On April 15, 2014, Beavis
parked in the car park, but overstayed the two-hour limit by almost an hour. Id. at
[92]. Beavis argued that the £85 charge was unenforceable at common law as a
penalty, and that it was unfair and unenforceable by virtue of the Unfair Terms in
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analysis that presents a look at the specific impact on different
classes of patients, including individual uninsured patients and
those patients who do not qualify for Medicaid to see how high
deductibles will bleed family savings. The expert should be able
to provide evidence using healthcare statistics to a devastating
effect on these classes of patients, forcing some to choose between
food, education, and basic necessities, or paying for the deductible
and causing, at the very least, anxiety. For those many on
Medicare, the issue can be their deductibles.
Often, the
deductible can be up to $1,600 per month,224 and could also
include paying a “donut hole” amount, where Medicare requires
patient payment prior to providing access to additional
coverage.225
Importantly, as will become plain from the discussion in Part
III, with respect to ways in which to avoid the problems of
individualization that can arise from litigation approaches to the
development of compensation for injury victims, the experts’
analysis should not end in segregating harm to subgroups of
patients.226 The plaintiffs’ counsel should not segregate patients
into their financial situations, for, as we will see using the Barton
and Burke analysis, this would only pit groups of patients against
each other, and end up pushing off the higher prices onto those
less severely injured emotionally. In the cases against Turing and
Valeant, the difference between the pre-takeover price of the drug
and the post-takeover price should provide sufficient evidence of
significant anxiety for their individual economic situation, to
overcome the commonality hurdle.
In the alternative, a court might choose to exercise its
settlement oversight responsibilities227 by requiring that the
expert suggest a price that would fairly provide for the value of
the drug in the market—with an eye towards its development
costs—and manufacturing costs, as well as a reasonable return.228
In this regard, the expert would likely turn to other markets to

Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. Id. at [119]. The Court of Appeals upheld the
decision that rejected Beavis’ arguments. Id. at [214]; see also Cavendish Square
Holding BV (2015) (UKSC) [214].
224. Medicare Part D Donut Hole – Medicare Coverage Gap, eHealth Medicare,
http://www.ehealthmedicare.com/medicare-part-d-prescription/donut-hole/
(last
visited Aug. 24, 2016).
225. Id.
226. See supra, Part III. B.
227. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). See also Alexander, supra note 204, at 9.
228. Id.
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determine the value of the drug or similar drugs.229 The expert
might provide information using a “price referencing” model,230
such as that employed by the Canadian government in
determining what it will pay for a drug.231 This method is also
used in Europe to determine the price the insurance providers will
pay for the drugs.232
It is important to note that in setting a drug’s price, the court
should require the expert to provide an opinion on a price for the
drug for the class of patients as a whole. Otherwise, the
unintended effect on lowering the price for Medicare patients will
likely raise the price for everyone else.233 This is the exact effect
Congress was worried about when it prohibited Medicare from
negotiating lower prices for drugs.234 If this were to be a court’s
requirements for pricing class actions, the insurance companies
may even join these cases on behalf of their patients. Their
interests are aligned regarding pricing, for while their insureds
are protected, they all pay for drugs far in excess of the drugs’
anticipated costs (and premiums charged).
The unjust
enrichment that occurs to the drug company comes from the
antitrust prohibitions on insurers to collectively bargain for drug
prices.235 Insurers are held hostage by the “free market” to pay
the exorbitant prices. Absent the lawsuit, they have no means to
“negotiate” for lower prices for individual patients with those drug
needs.
Other arguments for certifying a class of all drug users of a
particular life-saving drug, despite the exact commonality and
severity of their emotional distress, comes from the monopoly

229.
230.
231.
232.

Rugerri & Nolte, supra note 8.
Id.
Id.
Rugerri & Nolte, supra note 8 (reporting on how value is determined on an
internal price referencing model).
233. See Robert H. Ballance, Market and Industrial Structure, in CONTESTED
GROUND: PUBLIC PURPOSE AND PRIVATE INTEREST IN THE REGULATION OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 95, 103-104 (Peter Davis ed., 1996); David J. Gross et al., Prices
for Prescription Drugs: The Roles of Market Forces and Government Regulation, in
Contested Ground 124, 134; PATRICIA M. DANZON, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE
REGULATION: NATIONAL POLICIES VERSUS GLOBAL INTERESTS 3-4 (1997), available at
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/-pharmaceutical-price-regulationglobal-interests_11361924090.pdf.
234. See Hogberg, supra note 34.
235. Editorial Board, Sneaky Ways to Raise Drug Profits, N.Y. TIMES (June 8,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/08/opinion/sneaky-ways-to-raise-drugprofits.html?_r=1. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013); Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.
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effect on the markets of patents236—and the lack of transparency
and information in the market concerning competitive drugs,
generics, and prices.237 Again, without a class certification, not
even collective bargaining can overcome the monopoly effect of the
patent in the case of life-saving drugs. Instead of involving the
government or a bureaucracy as the representative of the
patients, the advantage of the class action tort lawsuit is that the
patients’ attorney acts as a direct representative of the group.238
C. ADVERSARIAL LITIGATION VS. LEGISLATIVE
REGULATION
Assuming then, at least for settlement purposes, that a class
could be certified, there are a number of advantages that would
236. By definition, patents grant a monopoly. David R. Henderson, Patents, THE
CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
ECONOMICS,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/Patents.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2016).
237. Jeffrey C. Lerner, Daniel M. Fox, Todd Nelson & John B. Reiss, The
Consequence of Secret Prices: The Politics of Physician Preference Items, 6 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 1560 (2008).
238. Rugerri & Nolte, supra note 8, at 16-17. There are two different types of
pricing. The first is “external reference” pricing, which refers to the cost of the same
drugs in “baskets” of other markets the country selects for comparison prices. The
second is called “internal pricing,” and allows some room for higher prices for new
drugs, based on their value in the market, and based on their costs to manufacture.
Id. There is no clear winner between these two different models. Id. Rugerri and Nolte
describe the French system with respect to “how value is determined”:
[T]he Transparency Commission at the French National Authority
for Health determines the added therapeutic benefit for all new
drugs, the amelioration du service médical rendu (ASMR). The
Transparency Commission distinguishes five ASMR levels:
I.
[M]ajor improvement (new therapeutic area, reduction of
morality)
II. [S]ignificant improvement in efficacy and/or reduction of sideeffects
III. [M]odest improvement in efficacy and/or reduction of sideeffects
IV. [M]inor improvement
V. [N]o improvement
New pharmaceutical products are evaluated according to the following criteria:

[E]ffectiveness and possible side-effects

[P]osition in the therapeutic spectrum relative to other
[A]vailable treatments

[S]everity of disease or condition

[C]linical profile of the drug

[P]ublic health impact.
There are no separate schemes for different categories of drugs. All new
drugs fall under the same scheme. Id.
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redound to the patients and the U.S. healthcare consumer in
general. As a matter of policy, tort litigation can provide a
superior approach to waiting for legislative action. Barnes and
Burke, in their book, “How Policy Shapes Politics: Rights, Courts,
Litigation, and the Struggle Over Injury Compensation,”239
analyze various approaches taken in the U.S. to address issues of
injury compensation.240 The authors use a case study approach,
examining Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)
legislation, asbestos litigation, and vaccine injury compensation
to help determine the advantages and disadvantages that exist as
a result of taking an adversarial approach, rather than waiting
for legislation to address a question of injury compensation.241
Barnes and Burke anticipate four serious objections to
adversarial litigation:
(1) [I]t crowds out other forms of political action,
especially lobbying for legislative change, (2) it is
particularly “sticky” and path-dependent, potentially
locking governments into bad policies, (3) it creates
polarizing backlashes, and (4) it individualizes
interests, thus undermining social solidarity.242
Barnes and Burke determined that the first three objections
are overstated, at least in the cases they studied.243 This Essay
suggests that these same objections will also overstate difficulties
to the use of the courts to remedy exorbitant pricing of lifesaving
drugs. For example, concerning the question of whether litigation
will foreclose efforts on the legislative front, as of the time of this
writing, Congress is conducting at least two hearings on the
questions of high-priced drugs.244 Senator Bernie Sanders is
leading the charge on behalf of Veterans,245 and others (e.g.,
Senator McCaskill) are investing through hearings on the Special
Committee on Aging.246 On the other hand, election year in

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

BARNES & BURKE, supra note 31.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sarah N. Lynch & Bill Berkot, Senate Panel Focuses on Toll of Valeant,
Turing Drug Price Spikes, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2015) http://www.reuters.com/article/ussenate-drugs-hearing-idUSKBN0TS2LI20151209..
245. Press Release, Majority News, Senate Panel Probes Exorbitant Prices for
Hepatitis C Dugs (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.veterans.senate.gov/newsroom/majoritynews/senate-panel-probes-exorbitant-prices-for-hepatitis-c-drugs.
246. Senators Collins, McCaskill Announce that Former Turing CEO Martin
Shkreli has Invoked the fifth Amendment, 114th Cong. (2016).
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politics may make it very difficult for legislation to make its way
through. In any event, courts are unlikely to foreclose a
legislative remedy, but may, in fact, educate the public to the
problem and drum up support for any future legislative solution.
Further, as to whether a litigation approach becomes “sticky”
and path dependent, as in other areas of injury compensation,247
there is nothing that locks a legislature in to court decisions with
regard to common law torts. On the contrary, the inability to
create a legislative solution may, in part, be related to path
dependencies that are created by other legislation. For example,
the Sherman Antitrust Act has already prohibited insurance
companies from aligning in order to negotiate lower prices for
drugs where the state does not already act to regulate pricing.248
Since individual insureds are scattered across multiple insurance
companies, the focus of patients is to get coverage from their
insurance providers, not to pay lower prices for drugs. On an
individual patient basis, it is seldom worth it for insurance
companies to litigate for lower prices, especially where they can
pass on costs by raising insurance premiums. Perhaps as
insurance companies merge, these incentives will change. On the
other hand, the less competition among insurers also presents
worrisome effects on user services and costs.249 If prices
moderate, more companies may be able to compete with respect
to the services they provide.
To add to the path dependency problem caused by other
legislation, Congress enacted healthcare legislation in 2003,250
which prohibited Medicare from negotiating with drug companies
for lower prices.251 Drug companies were worried that, by
enlarging Medicare and shrinking state-funded Medicaid, their
profits would be severely affected, restricting research and
development for new drugs.252 Also, worried that giving the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) the power to
247. BARNES & BURKE, supra note 31, at 15.
248. The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides, in relevant part, that “the Sherman
Act . . . shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business
is not regulated by State law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012).
249. Hogberg, supra note 34.
250. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066.
251. Id.
252. Negotiating for Lower Drug Costs in Medicare Part D, Nat’l Comm. to Pres.
Soc.
Sec.
&
Medicare,
http://www.ncpssm.org/EntitledtoKnow/entryid/2061/negotiating-for-lower-drugcosts-in-medicare-part-d (last visited Aug. 24, 2016).
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negotiate lower prices would only raise the price of those drugs for
private insurers,253 Congress seemingly elected for competition
between insurers on the quality of the serves they provided rather
than give the government the ability to use their collective
bargaining power to moderate drug prices. Accordingly, any
legislation that would be designed to set prices would also have to
take on the task of amending both antitrust legislation and other
healthcare legislation.
As we have seen, the courts’ equitable powers can overcome
these legislative path dependencies without violating the
legislation.254
Patients could bargain directly with drug
companies for original or lower prices on lifesaving drugs.
Insurance companies could be left to compete on the basis of the
quality of services they provide, and there is no harm done to
principles of antitrust law. Moreover, should the need arise,
legislatures can always overrule courts and preempt them.
As to the third objection described by Barnes and Burke,255
there appears to be little potential for backlash from court
decisions against exorbitant drug pricing. In fact, absent court
decisions, the drug behavior may be normalized, hidden from view
by the lack of transparency in the market. Drug companies
themselves may justify more increases, in light of the fact that
“everyone” is doing it. Court decisions are, at least initially,
directed at individual companies masquerading as drug
companies. Assuming the court certifies a class of patients, there
is little chance of backlash from private insurers or employerprovided plans. After all, these groups are in favor paying lower
prices for lifesaving drugs.
With respect to the fourth objection, Barnes and Burke do
find some evidence to support the argument that adversarial
litigation individualizes the injury compensation problem and
potentially pits one patient, drug company, or insurance scheme
against another when it comes to seeking remedies for a
particular lifesaving drug.256 Next to be considered, then, is
whether bringing individual class action cases for specific pricing
of lifesaving will send adequate signals to drug manufacturers to
moderate their pricing. Or, would it be better to wait for a
comprehensive approach to drug price regulation through
legislation?
253.
254.
255.
256.

Hogberg, supra note 34.
BARNES & BURKE, supra note 33, at 17-20.
Id.
Id.
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It is true that the courts will have difficult in deciding which
drugs are classified as lifesaving drugs. Drugs used to treat
Cancer (including those to reduce tumors), to control debilitating
pain, or to treat ailments of vital organs appear easy targets for
price gouging without any tort effect. But what about drugs that
treat diabetes, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, depression,
pneumonia, malaria, or various tropic diseases? Will tort lawsuits
end up pitting patients with various disease against one another
in the process of their lobbying Congress to qualify as a lifesaving
drug? In addition, what about companies that come to the market
with an exorbitant price, or those that have prices that increase
more gradually over time?257 As has been shown, claims that
qualify under IIED or NIED consist of facts where defendants
take over existing drugs that have already established markets
and pricing. As such, these cases will not impact drug pricing
needed for the development of new drugs. Additionally, while
drug companies may deal creatively with ways to hide exorbitant
prices, their activities will create a paper trail that will eventually
be noticed by individual patients. Just as in the case of bad faith
insurance, lawyers will be on the lookout for evidence of extreme
and outrageous price increases, without justification, and respond
with ways to uncover these practices.
Finally, as discussed above, if a court only certifies as to
Medicare or Medicaid patients, there is an additional
individualization issue that may pit some insurers against others.
On the other hand, if the court certifies the class for all patients
taking the drug, then such an individualization issue will
disappear. Class certification, therefore, provides a mechanism
to overcome the problems associated with individualization that
are typically associated with adversarial litigation.
It is true that, in the area of SSDI, legislation that treats all
disabilities develops more efficient and effective protections than
if each disability had to make its own individual case in the
legislature or in court.258 And, for example, giving the power to
the Veterans Administration to negotiate the price of drugs to
treat veterans can effectively work to regulate prices for veterans.
On the other hand, legislation that does not cover all patients
using a particular drug, but only those in particular government
257. There is much evidence in the market that such practices are already being
employed. See Editorial Board, No Justification for High Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/opinion/sunday/no-justification-forhigh-drug-prices.html.
258. BARNES & BURKE, supra note 33, at 52.
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programs, can end up pushing on to private insurers the high
prices of the drugs. However, where the class allows negotiation
for drug pricing regardless of the special characteristics of
patients, price moderation cannot be passed on to other
consumers. As a result, unlike the initial politics of providing
Disability Insurance, which pitted businesses against those with
disabilities, the high price of drugs affects the size of government
expenditures paid for by public dollars. The dollars paid are not
a zero-sum game between different classes of patients, but are
funded by moderating the profits of an already enormously
profitable industry. Barnes and Burke show that this very
problem was overcome in the case of SSDI through the actions of
individual states, arguing the unfair effects on state Medicare
funds, if the federal government did not address the problem
uniformly.259 Class action certifications can remedy the state-bystate unfairness of different pricing under different plans in
different states, and still be a result of direct negotiations between
patients and drug companies in light of the prices originally
charged, and those charged after the takeover.
In addition, the effect of a class action price moderation will
send signals to the market for similar drugs to voluntarily
moderate their prices. The moderated effect of the tort system on
business behavior will operate like it did in the case of bad faith
insurance practices. We turn, in Part V, to the case of the law of
bad faith insurance to see how an integrated approach might lead
to a moderation of all drug prices in the U.S. market.
Finally, this Essay argues that the lessons learned from bad
faith insurance law are predictors of the effect of adversarial
litigation in the case of exorbitant drug prices and not the problem
of individualism.
V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BAD FAITH LAW
There are a number of reasons to consider the history of the
development of bad faith insurance law as a bellwether for
developing policy in relation to exorbitant pricing of lifesaving
drugs. First, its history demonstrates the public need for
protection against the emotional harm caused by shady business
practices designed to take advantage of individuals during a
crisis, whether because they are injured, disabled, suffered a loss
from theft or fire, or the death of a spouse or parent.260 Second, it
259. Id.
260. Mark J. Browne, Ellen S. Pryor & Bob Puelz, The Effect of Bad-Faith Laws
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shows how early bad faith regulatory legislation failed because it
lacked the teeth that litigation can provide to change behavior.261
Third, it shows the continued shortcoming that a state-by-state
approach takes, absent some nationally coordinated legislation
designed to guard against the most egregious practices.262
The first wave of change against extreme insurance practices
came, not from the courts, but from state legislatures.263 Still,
states were not all quick to adopt protections. As of 1951, only
one quarter of the states enacted legislation that provided for
attorney’s fees and penalties in those cases where insurance
companies “engaged in denying insured’s claims in bad faith.” 264
Such legislation was enacted to provide recovery in instances
where insurers defaulted on their obligations to pay benefits.265
Then, in the 1970s, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) created legislation that was meant to
address claim settlements. Mary Cryar, in her article, If We Knew
Then What We Know Now – The Evolution of Insurance Bad Faith,
provides that the legislation:
1. Only prohibited certain acts when the insurer acts
flagrantly and in conscious disregard or if it
commits such acts so often as render it a general
business practice.
2. Silent as to any remedies for individual claimants.
on First-Party Insurance Claims Decisions, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 355, 355-56 (2004);
Robert H. Jerry, II, The Wrong Side of the Mountain: A Comment on Bad Faith’s
Unnatural History, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1317-18 (1994). For a general introduction
to the debate over the fairness or efficiency benefits of bad faith laws, see Ellen Smith
Pryor & Charles Silver, Symposium on the Law of Bad Faith in Contract and
Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1203-07 (1994). For analyses of the various costs and
benefits of a tort-based cause of action for bad faith denials of first-party claims, see
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 183-88 (1986); Mark Gergen, A Cautionary
Tale About Contractual Good Faith in Texas, 72 TEX. L. REV. 125, 125-36 (1994);
Robert H. Jerry, II, Remedying Insurers’ Contract Performance: A Reassessment, 18
CONN. L. REV. 271, 272 (1986); Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Breach of Contract By FirstParty Insurers, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 405, 406-08 (1996).
261. See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Natural History of the Insurer’s Liability for
Bad Faith, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1295, 1298-1300 (1994).
262. Id.
263. Michael E. DeBow, The Intersection of Insurance Bad Faith Litigation and
State Insurance Regulation: A Reconsideration, GEORGE MASON SCHOOL OF LAW, LAW
&
ECONOMICS
CENTER
1,
1
(2015),
available
at
http://www.masonlec.org/site/rte_uploads/files/DEBOW_Bad-Faith-paper-1-1-1.pdf.
264. Mary K. Cryar, If We Knew Then What We Know Now—The Evolution of
Insurance Bad Faith, Insurance Bad Faith and Extra-Contractual Liability (June
2013)
1,
4,
available
at
www.dri.org/DRI/course-materials/2013BadFaith/pdfs/01_Cryar.pdf.
265. Id.
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3. Only enables state insurance regulators to seek
injunctive relief or penalties as a way to enforce
the regulations.266
Additionally, Cryar provides that “[t]he majority of courts
have held this legislation does not create a private right of action
for insureds,”267 and that it was unsuccessful in assisting
insureds.268
As a result of the failures of legislation, courts started to
develop ways in which insureds would receive remedies in their
actions.
Social pressure pushed for relief from unjustified
delays in processing and arbitrary refusals to pay
claims, and insureds began utilizing private attorneys
to advance their interests. This forced the courts to
finally take a serious look at the claims process and
eventually gave rise to the common-law tort or bad
faith that we have today.269
The “first development in bad faith” came from:
[T]he third-party insurance arena.
Originally,
liability policies as we know them today did not exist.
Rather, third party insurance was via indemnity
policies . . . [that] only obligated the insurer to pay
monies to a third party if two requirements were met.
One, the insured had to have been held liable and two,
the insured actually had to have paid the judgment to
the third party. If the insured was insolvent, or for
some other reason, did not pay the third party, the
insurer had no obligation to pay any amount. The tort
victim similarly had no remedy against the insurer.
Liability policies, on the other hand, obligate the
insurer to pay the third party once the liability has
been established, without any requirement that
insured first pay the victim.270
Indemnity policies eventually:
[V]anished from the third party arena, and were
replaced with liability policies. Why? The public was
not satisfied with indemnity policies. It offended

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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common sense for the insurer to avoid liability solely
because the insured could not pay the judgment first.
Sometimes, insurers even colluded with insureds to
secure and adjudication of bankruptcy for the latter so
the insurer could avoid its obligations under an
indemnity policy. This pressure gave rise to court and
legislative action. State legislatures began enacting
“direct action” statutes. Courts began construing
indemnity policies like liability policies, absent clear
policy language that limited the insurer’s obligation to
paying what the insurer paid the tort victim. Courts
also began holding insurers to be estopped from
denying any obligation to pay third party claimants
once the insurer assumed control of the defense.271
Cryar further opined:
As a result of these changes, indemnity policies
gradually disappeared, leaving insurers issuing
liability policies, which contained language that
permitted the development of third party bad faith
actions. First party bad faith took over. An insurance
relationship was seen as one in which the insured
sought security. Like good health insurance, it
protected the accumulation of savings from one’s
lifetime of labor against the vagaries of accidents and
disease.
It was not obtained for commercial
advantage, but is instead protection against a
calamity. The consequences of the breach of an
insurance contract by the insurer were broader than
merely not receiving payment. Instead, the insured
who did not promptly receive payment would suffer
financial harm and even more importantly to this
discussion, emotional distress. To recover, the insured
may have to incur attorney’s fees.272
Most jurisdictions adopted a cause of action for bad faith in
first party insurance.273 But each state’s law is marked by unique
aspects that require considerable care in determining “the law” in
a given state. Cryar divided the jurisdictions into categories:
1. Some jurisdictions refuse to recognize a cause of
action for first-party and bad faith and have no or

271. Id.
272. Id. at 7.
273. Id. at 8.
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limited statutory remedies for violation of claims
practice standards.
About half, or perhaps fewer than half, uses a
variation of the [rule against acting] unreasonable
or without proper cause.
A larger group, such as in Iowa, use some version
of “fairly debatable” rule. . . .
Others, such as Utah, while recognizing bad faith,
have tied it to its contract roots, rather than
creating a tort action.
Many jurisdictions have enacted statutes which
define bad faith or prohibit unfair claim practices,
such as in Georgia and Louisiana.274

What lessons can be learned from this history of Bad Faith
Insurance Law that can map onto our analysis of the exorbitant
pricing situation?
 Even where state insurance regulators already were in
place, enforcement was uneven.275
 Unless specific remedies are provided for in legislation,
courts may be uncomfortable with making market
decisions about “fair” practices. Still, where the price had
been set and a new owner raises that price, the
unreasonableness of such pricing is more easily proven.276
 As the U.S. shifts to a national health insurance system
that seeks to provide universal coverage, court oversight is
needed to prevent insurers from taking advantage of
insureds in emergency situations.277 Just as it is bad faith,
and a breach of the very reason for health insurance—to
protect against catastrophic losses, including emotional
distress and anxiety threatened by the loss of life savings
for insurance companies to threaten non-payment,
impossible notice requirements, penalty clauses, or raising
rates or deductibles during a coverage period, it is similarly
bad faith for a drug company to effect the same losses—
financial and emotional—by raising prices.
 Insurance itself will become too expensive if prices of drugs
are raised arbitrarily high in the middle of their coverage
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id. (emphasis added).
Abraham, supra note 261, at 1295.
Id.
Id.
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cycle.278
 Without granting a private cause of action, the regulation
is not likely to be effective.279
 If state court definitions vary, multistate class actions are
not likely to be granted.280
Finally, then, state-by-state legislative fixes will present
difficulties for all patients seeking a lowering of prices of their
drugs. While the U.S. litigation systems provide fixes for these
problems, a nationwide regulatory body may be necessary to
regulate the drug companies’ behavior. For example, multidistrict litigation (MDL) procedures provide courts a path to
coordinate and consolidate cases involving patients adversely
affected by product defects in medical devices.281 The same can
be employed to coordinate pricing problems with drugs; yet
coordination problems and conflict of laws and interests problems
proliferate in MDLs.
In the event that tort law does not find its way to a remedy,
then legislation should be enacted to moderate the pricing of
lifesaving drugs in the U.S. The experience of state development
of rules against bad faith insurance practices and breaches of
covenants of good faith and fair dealing should be instructive in
this regard. By providing for attorney’s fees and punitive
damages, legislation can also provide incentives to the private
attorney general provisions of tort law, to effectively discipline the
market as a whole.282 On the other hand, current Supreme Court
rulings restrict the awarding of punitive damages by a state court
to conduct occurring within that state.283 It will also provide the
incentives to keep an eye out for creative attempts at exacting fees
and prices that take advantage of emergency contexts inherent in
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., DePuy Orthopedics, Inc., ASR Hip Implant Products Liability
Litigation, MDL 2197, http://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/home/clerk-s-office-and-courtrecords/multidistrict-litigation-cases/mdl-2197/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2016). A full
description of Multidistrict Panel Rules and Procedures is available online. Rules of
Procedure of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (July 6,
2011),
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Panel_Rules-Amended-7-62011_With_Index-6-5-2014.pdf.
282. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 420 (2003).
Before Campbell, DeBow reports that a database assembled by Helland and Klick
contains information on 748 class action suits filed against 130 insurance companies
“that were open at least one point during the period of 1992 to 2002.” See DeBow, supra
note 263, at 11.
283. Id.
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the market for lifesaving drugs. These regulations reveal the
same tensions in the law and free market between fundamental
belies in a liberal society that pricing should be set by the maker
of a product, and yet the government needs to regulate where
there exists emergencies and where producers lack the morality
required to protect against extortionate practices.
These
regulations and subsequent common law adaptations will provide
a road map for similar efforts by the states to develop regulations
against exorbitant prices of lifesaving drugs.
VI. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, tort law principles provide a remedy to
moderate exorbitant pricing of lifesaving drugs. On the other
hand, requirements of “severity of emotional distress” might
make it difficult for courts to certify classes of cases in order to get
at the common vulnerability interest that is violated by such
behavior. In addition, courts worrying about whether they are
legislating may balk at extending legal duties through affirmative
duty and negligence doctrines. Perhaps courts will adopt creative
approaches to these situations and allow cases to be brought by a
class of plaintiffs similarly impacted by the exorbitant pricing.
Once certified, an injunction threatening the price increases could
generate the necessary leverage to moderate pricing through
negotiations between patients and drug makers.
Important policy considerations dictate that the courts
should not wait for the legislature to deal with the problem.
Adversarial litigation grounds pricing moderation in wellestablished precedents of common law tort, whether IIED or
NIED that should at least warrant the formation of a class action
and consideration of injunctions or other equitable remedies.
Waiting will not create bad policies, path dependencies, backlash,
or problems of individualization because the nature of the pricing
problem is not a zero sum game. The pricing of drugs by takeover
artists does not relate to costs of development. Vague promises to
use of profits for the development of future drugs are too
tangential to justify the effect on the price paid by the patient, and
by the public generally, as well as their effect on depletion of the
life savings of individual patients.284 It constitutes unjust
284. TransAmerica’s 16th Annual Retirement Survey gives some evidence for how
quickly an upper-middleclass person would go through their savings when they have
to pay $30,000 per year for drugs. The company culled data from over 4,500 online
interviews of those interested enough to fill out their survey, in order to determine the
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enrichment rather than providing for necessary incentive for the
development of the drugs. In addition, the price negotiated is not
set by a bureaucracy, and not subject to potential capture by
industry, or corruption from payoffs or kickbacks. The price gets
negotiated by the patients’ representatives, supervised by the
courts, and advised by experts on both sides, seeking to make the
case for fair pricing.
Absent such innovation, the remedy for exorbitant pricing
may lie in legislation that is patterned on Bad Faith Insurance
legislation. On the other hand, such legislation will be ineffective
unless an administrative agency is authorized with its
enforcement. Since it is unlikely that the FDA would be
empowered in this regard, perhaps the best regulator may be
Medicare. Empowering CMS to regulate pricing for Medicare
creates its own individualization problems, potentially causing
higher prices to be put off on private insurers provided by
employers. This will soon being about the end of private
employer-provided plans and the political and economic
consequences could signal the end of national health insurance.
In the short run, an adversarial litigation approach is the
next best alternative and can be developed under existing
doctrines of tort law, existing procedures for class certification,
and under existing remedies. For maximum effectiveness,
Congress should enact national legislation that explicitly gives
patients standing to bring suit, and provides private enforcement
actions that include rights to class certification, attorneys’ fees,
injunctions, and punitive damages. Such legislation can insure
that the courts avoid the pitfalls of bad faith insurance legislation.
It also avoids the problems of bureaucratic solutions that languish
without agency resources to withstand industry capture. It
remedies delays and inaction of government regulatory schemes
that cause emotional harm to patients, and enriches and rewards
those most immoral actors in the market for lifesaving drugs.

average American’s retirement savings by age. The results showed that the savings
would be: $16,000 for people in their 20s, $45,000 for people in their 30s, $62,000 for
people in their 40s, $117,000 for people in their 50s, and $172,000 for people in their
60s. Transamerica Center for Retirement Studies, 16th Annual Transamerica
Retirement Survey: A Compendium of Findings About American Workers (Aug. 2015),
http://www.transamericacenter.org/docs/default-source/resources/centerresearch/16th-annual/tcrs2015_sr_16th_compendium_of_workers.pdf.

